van Elteren Casper, Vasconcelos Vítor V, Lees Mike
Computational Science Lab, Informatics Institute, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Institute for Advanced Study, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Sci Rep. 2024 Jul 30;14(1):17678. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-68445-0.
The interplay between (criminal) organizations and (law enforcement) disruption strategies is critical in criminology and social network analysis. Like legitimate businesses, criminal enterprises thrive by fulfilling specific demands and navigating their unique challenges, including balancing operational visibility and security. This study aims at comprehending criminal networks' internal dynamics, resilience to law enforcement interventions, and robustness to changes in external conditions. Using a model based on evolutionary game theory, we analyze these networks as collaborative assemblies of roles, considering expected costs, potential benefits, and the certainty of expected outcomes. Here, we show that criminal organizations exhibit strong hysteresis effects, with increased resilience and robustness once established, challenging the effectiveness of traditional law enforcement strategies focused on deterrence through increased punishment. The hysteresis effect defines optimal thresholds for the formation or dissolution of criminal organisation. Our findings indicate that interventions of similar magnitude can lead to vastly different outcomes depending on the existing state of criminality. This result suggests that the relationship between stricter punishment and its deterrent effect on organized crime is complex and sometimes non-linear. Furthermore, we demonstrate that network structure, specifically interconnectedness (link density) and assortativity of specialized skills, significantly influences the formation and stability of criminal organizations, underscoring the importance of considering social connections and the accessibility of roles in combating organized crime. These insights contribute to a deeper understanding of the systemic nature of criminal behavior from an evolutionary perspective and highlight the need for adaptive, strategic approaches in policy-making and law enforcement to disrupt criminal networks effectively.
(犯罪)组织与(执法)破坏策略之间的相互作用在犯罪学和社会网络分析中至关重要。与合法企业一样,犯罪企业通过满足特定需求并应对其独特挑战(包括平衡运营可见性和安全性)而蓬勃发展。本研究旨在理解犯罪网络的内部动态、对执法干预的恢复力以及对外部条件变化的稳健性。我们使用基于进化博弈论的模型,将这些网络分析为角色的协作集合,考虑预期成本、潜在收益以及预期结果的确定性。在此,我们表明犯罪组织表现出强烈的滞后效应,一旦建立,恢复力和稳健性就会增强,这对传统执法策略通过增加惩罚来威慑的有效性提出了挑战。滞后效应定义了犯罪组织形成或解散的最佳阈值。我们的研究结果表明,类似规模的干预可能会因犯罪的现有状态而导致截然不同的结果。这一结果表明,更严厉的惩罚与其对有组织犯罪的威慑效果之间的关系是复杂的,有时是非线性的。此外,我们证明网络结构,特别是相互连接性(链接密度)和专业技能的 assortativity,会显著影响犯罪组织的形成和稳定性,强调了在打击有组织犯罪时考虑社会联系和角色可及性的重要性。这些见解有助于从进化角度更深入地理解犯罪行为的系统性本质,并突出了在政策制定和执法中采用适应性战略方法以有效破坏犯罪网络的必要性。