Institute of Applied Health Research, University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.
NIHR Birmingham Biomedical Research Centre, University Hospitals Birmingham NHS Foundation Trust and University of Birmingham, Birmingham, UK.
BMC Health Serv Res. 2024 Aug 14;24(1):929. doi: 10.1186/s12913-024-11350-z.
The English National Health Service has multiple waiting time standards relating to cancer diagnosis and treatment. Targets can have unintended effects, such as prioritisation based on targets instead of clinical need. In this case, a `threshold effect' will appear as a spike in hospitals just meeting the target.
We conducted a retrospective study of publicly available cancer waiting time data, including a 2-week wait for a specialist appointment, a 31-day decision to first treatment and a 62-day referral to treatment standard that attracted a financial penalty. We examined the performance of hospital trusts against these targets by financial year to look for threshold effects, using Cattaneo et al. manipulation density test.
Trust performance against cancer waiting targets declined over time, and this trend accelerated since the start of the Covid-19 pandemic. Statistical evidence of a threshold effect for the 2-week and 31-day standard was only present in a few years. However, there was strong statistical evidence of a threshold effect for the 62-day standard across all financial years (p < 0.01).
The data suggests that the effect of threshold targets alters hospital behaviour at target levels but does not do so equally for all standards. Evidence of threshold effects for the 62-day standard was particularly strong, possibly due to some combination of a smaller volume of eligible patients, a larger penalty, multiple waypoints where hospitals can intervene, baseline performance against the target and where the target is set (i.e. how much headroom is available). RCTs of the use of threshold targets and of different designs for such targets in the future would be extremely informative.
英国国家医疗服务体系有多个与癌症诊断和治疗相关的等待时间标准。目标可能会产生意想不到的影响,例如根据目标而不是临床需求进行优先级排序。在这种情况下,会出现“门槛效应”,即刚好达到目标的医院数量会激增。
我们对公开可用的癌症等待时间数据进行了回顾性研究,包括两周内预约专家、31 天内决定首次治疗和 62 天内转介治疗标准(达到该标准会受到经济处罚)。我们按财政年度检查医院信托基金对这些目标的表现,以寻找门槛效应,使用 Cattaneo 等人的操纵密度测试。
随着时间的推移,医院信托基金对癌症等待目标的表现下降,自新冠疫情开始以来,这一趋势加速。只有在少数几年中,才有 2 周和 31 天标准的统计证据表明存在门槛效应。然而,在所有财政年度都有强烈的统计证据表明 62 天标准存在门槛效应(p<0.01)。
数据表明,门槛目标的效果会改变医院在目标水平上的行为,但对所有标准的影响并不相同。62 天标准的门槛效应证据尤其强烈,可能是由于符合条件的患者数量较少、罚款较大、医院可以干预的多个关键点、针对目标的基线表现以及目标设定的位置(即可用的空间有多大)等多种因素共同作用的结果。未来关于使用门槛目标和此类目标的不同设计的 RCT 将非常有意义。