University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, USA.
J Med Philos. 2024 Nov 22;49(6):532-546. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhae031.
One criticism of medical aid in dying (MAID) is the expressivist objection: MAID is morally wrong because it expresses judgments about disabilities or persons with disabilities, that are offensive, disrespectful, or discriminatory. The expressivist objection can be made at the level of individual patients, medical providers, or the state. The expressivist objection originated with selective abortion, and responses to it in that context typically claim either that selective abortion does not express specific judgments about disabilities, or that any judgments expressed are not offensive. This response is inadequate: MAID often does express negative judgments about disabilities, which could reasonably be seen as offensive. But, does this offensiveness make MAID wrong? Drawing on Joel Feinberg's account of offense, I argue that it is unlikely that the offensiveness of the judgments expressed by individuals who seek MAID or through the state's legalization of MAID is enough to make it morally impermissible.
对医疗辅助死亡（MAID）的批评之一是表现主义反对意见：MAID 在道德上是错误的，因为它表达了对残疾或残疾人士的判断，这些判断是冒犯性的、不尊重的或歧视性的。表现主义反对意见可以在个体患者、医疗提供者或国家层面提出。表现主义反对意见源于选择性堕胎，对此的回应通常要么声称选择性堕胎没有表达对残疾的具体判断，要么声称表达的任何判断都不是冒犯性的。这种回应是不充分的：MAID 通常确实对残疾表达了负面判断，这些判断可能被视为具有冒犯性。但是，这种冒犯性是否使 MAID 变得错误？我借鉴了乔尔·范伯格关于冒犯的论述，认为寻求 MAID 的个人或国家将 MAID 合法化所表达的判断的冒犯性不太可能足以使其在道德上是不允许的。
