Liu Yuyuan, Wang Lichen, Guo Ruqiang, Hua Shijia, Liu Linjie, Zhang Liang
College of Science, Northwest A&F University, Yangling, Shaanxi 712100, China.
Chaos. 2024 Sep 1;34(9). doi: 10.1063/5.0228886.
Trust plays a crucial role in social and economic interactions, serving as the foundation for social stability and human cooperation. Previous studies have explored the evolution of trust between investors and trustees by constructing trust game models, incorporating factors such as network structure, reputation, and incentives. However, these studies often assume that investors consistently maintain their investment behavior, neglecting the potential influence of the investment environment on investment behavior. To address this gap, we introduce a loss assessment mechanism and construct a trust game model. Specifically, investors first allocate their investment amount to an assessment agency, which divides the amount into two parts according to a certain allocation ratio. One part is used for investment assessment, and the results are fed back to the investors. If the payoff from this portion exceeds the investors' expected value, the remaining amount is invested; otherwise, it is returned to the investors. The results indicate that investors with moderate expectations are more likely to form alliances with trustworthy trustees, thereby effectively promoting the evolution of trust. Conversely, lower or higher expectations yield opposite results. Additionally, we find that as investors' expected values increase, the corresponding allocation ratio should also increase to achieve higher payoffs.
信任在社会和经济互动中起着至关重要的作用，是社会稳定和人类合作的基础。以往的研究通过构建信任博弈模型，纳入网络结构、声誉和激励等因素，探讨了投资者与受托人之间信任的演变。然而，这些研究往往假设投资者始终保持其投资行为，而忽略了投资环境对投资行为的潜在影响。为了弥补这一差距，我们引入了损失评估机制并构建了一个信任博弈模型。具体而言，投资者首先将其投资额分配给一个评估机构，该机构根据一定的分配比例将该金额分为两部分。一部分用于投资评估，结果反馈给投资者。如果这部分的收益超过投资者的预期值，则将剩余金额进行投资；否则，将其返还给投资者。结果表明，预期适中的投资者更有可能与值得信赖的受托人结成联盟，从而有效地促进信任的演变。相反，较低或较高的预期会产生相反的结果。此外，我们发现随着投资者预期值的增加，相应的分配比例也应增加，以实现更高的收益。
