Rostill Luke
Associate Professor of Property Law, University of Oxford; Fellow and Tutor in Law, Trinity College, Oxford.
Oxf J Leg Stud. 2024 Apr 19;44(3):733-754. doi: 10.1093/ojls/gqae012. eCollection 2024 Fall.
In , James Penner returns to and develops a project that he has been engaged in for nearly three decades: to replace the influential 'bundle of rights' picture of property, which he regards as irredeemably flawed, with an alternative account-one that regards property as a unified entitlement. In this review article, I expound and analyse the central features of Penner's theory. I defend the view that, in its original iteration, Penner's account was trebly monistic: it regarded property as a single entitlement justified by a single human interest and protected by a single duty of non-interference. I go on to critically examine one of Penner's central ideas-that to understand property it is necessary to understand its justification. Along the way, I trace how Penner's account has evolved and explain how certain alterations have put some problems to bed while generating others.
在[具体内容未提及]中，詹姆斯·彭纳回归并推进了一个他已钻研近三十年的项目：用一种替代性的观点取代有影响力但他认为存在不可救药缺陷的“权利束”财产观，该替代性观点将财产视为一种统一的权利。在这篇评论文章中，我阐述并分析彭纳理论的核心特征。我支持这样一种观点，即在其最初的版本中，彭纳的观点是三重一元论的：它将财产视为一种由单一人类利益证明合理并由单一不干涉义务保护的单一权利。我接着批判性地审视彭纳的一个核心观点——即要理解财产就必须理解其正当理由。在此过程中，我追溯彭纳的观点是如何演变的，并解释某些改变是如何解决了一些问题却又产生了其他问题的。
