Schuster Daniel, Mossig Ivo
Institute of Geography, University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany.
Environ Manage. 2025 Mar;75(3):490-504. doi: 10.1007/s00267-024-02050-9. Epub 2024 Sep 20.
This paper examines the Multistakeholder initiative (MSI) "German Initiative on Sustainable Cocoa (GISCO)". MSIs represent arenas in which heterogeneous actors from governments, businesses and civil society come together to achieve sustainability goals that they cannot achieve otherwise. The self-defined goals of GISCO are first, to improve the living conditions of cocoa farmers and their families; second, to conserve and protect natural resources and biodiversity; and third, to increase the share of sustainably produced cocoa. Although all stakeholder groups share these goals, they have different agendas and conflicting interests. Despite numerous case studies, no theoretical basis has been established on the functioning and success of negotiations in MSIs. Therefore, the question arises as to how the governance of an MSI can be captured empirically to explain (un)achieved outcomes of the collaboration. The contribution of this paper is the development of a theoretical framework and its application to the case study. Minutes of 84 meetings and 18 qualitative expert interviews were analyzed by social network analysis and qualitative content analysis using MaxQDA to identify (a) influential actors, (b) collaboration structures and (c) processes as well as (d) topics discussed to explain (not) achieved outcomes regarding the self-defined goals. The results provide detailed insight into the governance of an MSI. The MSI helps members to extend their individual networks and to learn from each other, but quickly reaches its limits in achieving the self-imposed common goals. One reason for this is the lack of representation of actors from the Global South, despite addressing environmental and living conditions there in two out of the three GISCO goals. Furthermore, it is shown that the structures and processes of decision-making within the MSI are designed in such a way that a lack of hierarchical directives, sanctions and other decision-making mechanisms makes negotiation-based compromises difficult. Consequently, the power of each stakeholder group to use their veto right to delay or prevent the changes required to achieve common goals cannot be overcome.
本文考察了多方利益相关者倡议（MSI）“德国可持续可可倡议（GISCO）”。多方利益相关者倡议代表了这样一些平台，来自政府、企业和民间社会的不同行为体汇聚于此，以实现他们无法单独达成的可持续发展目标。GISCO自行设定的目标，一是改善可可种植农及其家庭的生活条件；二是养护和保护自然资源及生物多样性；三是提高可持续生产的可可的占比。尽管所有利益相关者群体都认同这些目标，但他们有着不同的议程和相互冲突的利益。尽管有大量案例研究，但尚未建立起关于多方利益相关者倡议中谈判的运作及成功的理论基础。因此，问题在于如何通过实证来把握多方利益相关者倡议的治理情况，以解释合作（未）达成的成果。本文的贡献在于构建了一个理论框架并将其应用于案例研究。通过社会网络分析和使用MaxQDA的定性内容分析，对84次会议的会议记录和18次定性专家访谈进行了分析，以确定（a）有影响力的行为体、（b）合作结构和（c）流程，以及（d）所讨论的议题，以解释在其自行设定的目标方面（未）达成的成果。研究结果为多方利益相关者倡议的治理提供了详细洞察。多方利益相关者倡议有助于成员扩展各自的人际网络并相互学习，但在实现自行设定的共同目标方面很快就达到了极限。原因之一是，尽管GISCO的三个目标中有两个涉及全球南方的环境和生活条件，但却缺乏来自全球南方行为体的代表性。此外，研究表明，多方利益相关者倡议内部的决策结构和流程设计成这样，即缺乏层级指令、制裁及其他决策机制，使得基于谈判的妥协变得困难。因此，每个利益相关者群体利用其否决权来拖延或阻止实现共同目标所需变革的能力无法被克服。
