Chen Lili, Du Yanlin
School of Economics and Management of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, Beijing, China.
School of Environment and Natural Resources, Renmin University of China, Beijing, China.
Heliyon. 2024 Sep 17;10(18):e38000. doi: 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e38000. eCollection 2024 Sep 30.
The impact of CEO ability on corporate behavior is dual-faceted. Based on the "rent-seeking hypothesis", this paper focuses on the "dark side" of CEO ability and suggests that CEO ability may hurt corporate behavior. Using the DEA method to measure CEO ability and selecting Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as a sample, we examine the relationship, mechanisms, and boundary conditions between CEO ability and stock price crash risk. Our study finds that CEO ability exacerbates stock price crash risk positively. Mechanism tests based on CEO tenure, agency conflict, and litigation risk reveal that CEO ability intensifies stock price crash risk for alleviating career concerns, seeking private gains, and risk avoidance, supporting the "rent-seeking hypothesis". Boundary condition tests based on internal and external governance environments show that internal control quality and external audit supervision can play a governance role in mitigating the exacerbating effect of CEO ability on stock price crash risk. The conclusions are of significant importance for companies, relevant departments, and global market participants to strengthen governance and supervision to prevent the negative impact of CEO ability on stock prices, thereby promoting the stable development of global financial markets.
首席执行官（CEO）能力对公司行为的影响具有两面性。基于“寻租假说”，本文聚焦于CEO能力的“阴暗面”，认为CEO能力可能损害公司行为。运用数据包络分析（DEA）方法衡量CEO能力，并选取2007年至2017年中国A股上市公司作为样本，我们考察了CEO能力与股价崩盘风险之间的关系、作用机制及边界条件。我们的研究发现，CEO能力正向加剧股价崩盘风险。基于CEO任期、代理冲突和诉讼风险的机制检验表明，CEO能力因缓解职业担忧、谋取私利和规避风险而加剧股价崩盘风险，支持了“寻租假说”。基于内部和外部治理环境的边界条件检验表明，内部控制质量和外部审计监督能够在减轻CEO能力对股价崩盘风险的加剧作用方面发挥治理作用。这些结论对于公司、相关部门以及全球市场参与者加强治理和监督，以防止CEO能力对股价产生负面影响，进而促进全球金融市场的稳定发展具有重要意义。
