School of Accounting, Guangdong University of Finance and Economics, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China.
School of Accounting, Guangzhou Huashang College, Guangzhou, Guangdong, China.
PLoS One. 2024 Sep 27;19(9):e0308614. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0308614. eCollection 2024.
States encourage listed companies to use stock repurchase to elevate the market value of listed firms. After China's promulgation of the new Company Law in 2018, the number of listed companies that issued stock repurchase notices has increased, and the frequency is also increasing. But whether market value management is the real incentive for the action remains debatable. To reduce the risk of pledges, controlling shareholders may use stock repurchases to maintain the security of control rights, and stock repurchase notice may become a tool for controlling shareholders to manage pledge risks. From the perspective of pledge risk management, this paper selects the listed companies from 2012 to 2019 and finds that the share pledge of the controlling shareholder affects the stock repurchase behavior of listed companies by affecting the current pledge risk and the quality of information disclosure plays the interactive role between the two.
国家鼓励上市公司利用股票回购提升公司市值。2018 年中国新《公司法》颁布后，发布股票回购公告的上市公司数量有所增加，频率也在增加。但是，管理层收购是否是该行为的真正动机仍存在争议。为了降低质押风险，控股股东可能会利用股票回购来维护控制权的安全性，股票回购公告可能成为控股股东管理质押风险的工具。从质押风险管理的角度出发，本文选取了 2012 年至 2019 年的上市公司，发现控股股东的股权质押通过影响当前质押风险，进而影响上市公司的股票回购行为，而信息披露质量在两者之间发挥了交互作用。
