Li Xintao, Li Qian
School of Business and Management, Shanghai International Studies University, Shanghai, China.
Front Psychol. 2022 Apr 28;13:898118. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.898118. eCollection 2022.
The equity pledge has become a universal practice in the world. Taking Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2020 as a sample, this paper investigates the influence of controlling shareholders' equity pledges on M&A behavior. It is found that the probability of M&A of listed companies is greater when the controlling shareholder has an equity pledge (or the proportion of equity pledge of controlling shareholder is higher). M&A activities can raise the stock price and play the role of market value management. Controlling shareholders with margin call pressure have stronger motivation to use M&A to increase their share price. Investors seem to be aware of this behavior and underestimate the potential benefits of M&A under this pressure. Propensity score matching (PSM) and difference in difference (DID) were used to test endogeneity and the results were still robust. Overall, our results reveal the impact of equity pledges by controlling shareholders on M&A. Furthermore, margin call pressure, this organizational psychology promotes this possibility.
股权质押已成为全球通行的做法。本文以2007年至2020年的中国上市公司为样本，研究控股股东股权质押对并购行为的影响。研究发现，当控股股东进行股权质押（或控股股东的股权质押比例较高）时，上市公司的并购概率更大。并购活动可以提高股价并发挥市值管理的作用。面临平仓压力的控股股东有更强的动机利用并购来提高股价。投资者似乎意识到了这种行为，并低估了在这种压力下并购的潜在收益。使用倾向得分匹配法（PSM）和双重差分法（DID）检验内生性，结果仍然稳健。总体而言，我们的结果揭示了控股股东股权质押对并购的影响。此外，平仓压力这种组织心理促进了这种可能性。
