School of Business Administration, University of Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan, 114051, China.
School of Science, University of Science and Technology Liaoning, Anshan, 114051, China.
Sci Rep. 2024 Oct 3;14(1):22951. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-74286-8.
Competition in the international arena and business realm offers avenues for individual growth and advancement. Individuals using different means of competition can obtain unequal rewards. This paper claims that when no consensus is reached in business activities, defectors will choose conservative or militant defection strategies during market competition. Conservative defectors, who are in a comparatively weak position, need to pay the costs brought by market share losses. However, their personal abilities cannot be ignored, which prompts them to bravely choose the conservative defection strategy. This brings rewards to conservative defectors. Militant defectors, typically in stronger positions, also receive greater rewards. Research results establish an evolutionary game model of three strategies, the cooperation strategy, the conservative defection strategy, and the militant defection strategy. After the system is stable, this model displays two stable states. Through numerical simulation, it can be found that the personal abilities of conservative defectors play a decisive role in promoting cooperation. However, the market share losses of conservative defectors have periodical impacts on cooperation. Moreover, the threats of militant defectors to cooperation should be comprehensively considered in combination with the personal abilities of conservative defectors.
在国际舞台和商业领域的竞争为个人成长和进步提供了途径。个人可以通过不同的竞争手段获得不等的回报。本文认为，在商业活动中无法达成共识的情况下，市场竞争中背叛者会选择保守或激进的背叛策略。处于相对弱势地位的保守背叛者需要承担市场份额损失带来的成本，但他们的个人能力不可忽视，促使他们勇敢地选择保守的背叛策略，从而获得回报。处于强势地位的激进背叛者也会获得更大的回报。研究结果建立了合作策略、保守背叛策略和激进背叛策略三种策略的进化博弈模型。在系统稳定后，该模型显示出两个稳定状态。通过数值模拟可以发现，保守背叛者的个人能力对促进合作起着决定性作用。然而，保守背叛者的市场份额损失对合作有周期性的影响。此外，应该结合保守背叛者的个人能力综合考虑激进背叛者对合作的威胁。
