Venkataraman Pavithra, Mahilkar Anjali, Raj Namratha, Saini Supreet
Department of Chemical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai, India.
J Evol Biol. 2025 Jan 3;38(1):122-128. doi: 10.1093/jeb/voae128.
In evolutionary game theory, a relative comparison of the cost and benefit associated with obtaining a resource, called payoff, is used as an indicator of fitness of an organism. Payoffs of different strategies, quantitatively represented as payoff matrices, are used to understand complex inter-species and intra-species interactions like cooperation, mutualism, and altruism. Payoff matrices, however, are usually treated as invariant with time-largely due to the absence of any empirical data quantifying their evolution. In this paper, we present empirical evidence of three types of resource-dependent changes in the payoff matrices of evolving Saccharomyces cerevisiae populations. We show that depending on the carbon source and participating genotypes, N-player games could collapse, be born, or be maintained. Our results highlight the need to consider the dynamic nature of payoff matrices while making even short-term predictions about population interactions and dynamics.
在进化博弈论中，与获取资源相关的成本和收益的相对比较（称为收益）被用作生物体适应性的指标。不同策略的收益以收益矩阵的形式进行定量表示，用于理解诸如合作、互利共生和利他主义等复杂的种间和种内相互作用。然而，收益矩阵通常被视为不随时间变化——这主要是因为缺乏量化其进化的实证数据。在本文中，我们展示了酿酒酵母进化群体收益矩阵中三种类型的资源依赖性变化的实证证据。我们表明，根据碳源和参与的基因型，N 人博弈可能会崩溃、产生或维持。我们的结果强调，在对种群相互作用和动态进行哪怕是短期预测时，都需要考虑收益矩阵的动态性质。
