Robbett Andrea, Walsh Henry, Matthews Peter Hans
Department of Economics, Middlebury College, Middlebury, VT 05753, USA.
Department of Economics, Aalto University School of Business and Helsinki Graduate School of Economics, Helsinki 02150, Finland.
PNAS Nexus. 2024 Oct 15;3(10):pgae307. doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae307. eCollection 2024 Oct.
How does the availability of excuses for self-interested behavior impact group favoritism? We report the results of a preregistered experiment, conducted on the eve of the 2022 midterm elections, in which American political partisans made payoff distribution choices for themselves and a partner who was known to be a co-partisan or opposing partisan. Under full information, participants exhibit significant group favoritism. However, when the payoff consequences for one's partner are initially hidden, participants exploit this excuse to act selfishly regardless of who their partner is and ignorance rates are identical for in-group and out-group members. As a result, moral wiggle room has a significantly larger impact on selfish behavior for those interacting with co-partisans than opposing partisans, leading to a reduction in group favoritism.
出于私利行为的借口可用性如何影响群体偏袒？我们报告了一项在2022年中期选举前夕进行的预注册实验结果，其中美国政治党派人士为自己和一位已知是同党派或对立党派的伙伴做出收益分配选择。在完全信息情况下，参与者表现出显著的群体偏袒。然而，当对其伙伴的收益后果最初被隐藏时，参与者利用这个借口自私行事，无论其伙伴是谁，且内群体和外群体成员的无知率相同。结果，道德回旋空间对与同党派互动的人比对与对立党派互动的人在自私行为上有显著更大的影响，导致群体偏袒减少。
