Myers Simon, Everett Jim A C
Behavioural Science Group, Warwick Business School, University of Warwick, Scarman Rd, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK; School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP, UK.
School of Psychology, University of Kent, Canterbury, Kent, CT2 7NP, UK.
Cognition. 2025 Mar;256:106028. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2024.106028. Epub 2024 Dec 12.
As machines powered by artificial intelligence increase in their technological capacities, there is a growing interest in the theoretical and practical idea of artificial moral advisors (AMAs): systems powered by artificial intelligence that are explicitly designed to assist humans in making ethical decisions. Across four pre-registered studies (total N = 2604) we investigated how people perceive and trust artificial moral advisors compared to human advisors. Extending previous work on algorithmic aversion, we show that people have a significant aversion to AMAs (vs humans) giving moral advice, while also showing that this is particularly the case when advisors - human and AI alike - gave advice based on utilitarian principles. We find that participants expect AI to make utilitarian decisions, and that even when participants agreed with a decision made by an AMA, they still expected to disagree with an AMA more than a human in future. Our findings suggest challenges in the adoption of artificial moral advisors, and particularly those who draw on and endorse utilitarian principles - however normatively justifiable.
随着由人工智能驱动的机器技术能力不断提高，人们对人工道德顾问（AMA）的理论和实践理念的兴趣与日俱增：人工道德顾问是指由人工智能驱动的系统，其明确设计目的是协助人类做出道德决策。在四项预先注册的研究（总样本量N = 2604）中，我们调查了与人类顾问相比，人们如何看待和信任人工道德顾问。在先前关于算法厌恶的研究基础上进行拓展，我们发现人们对人工道德顾问（与人类相比）给出道德建议存在显著的厌恶情绪，同时还表明，当顾问——无论是人类还是人工智能——基于功利主义原则给出建议时，这种情况尤为明显。我们发现参与者期望人工智能做出功利主义决策，并且即使参与者同意人工道德顾问做出的决策，他们在未来仍然预计会比人类顾问更不同意人工道德顾问的意见。我们的研究结果表明，在采用人工道德顾问方面存在挑战，尤其是那些借鉴并支持功利主义原则的人工道德顾问——无论其在规范上多么合理。
