Khatri Narayan, Lee Sihyung, Nam Seung Yeob
Department of Information and Communication Engineering, Yeungnam University, Gyeongsan 38541, Republic of Korea.
School of Computer Science and Engineering, Kyungpook National University, Daegu 41566, Republic of Korea.
Sensors (Basel). 2024 Dec 20;24(24):8140. doi: 10.3390/s24248140.
In this paper, we propose a Proof-of-Location (PoL)-based location verification scheme for mitigating Sybil attacks in vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). For this purpose, we employ smart contracts for storing the location information of the vehicles. This smart contract is maintained by Road Side Units (RSUs) and acts as a ground truth for verifying the position information of the neighboring vehicles. To avoid the storage of fake location information inside the smart contract, vehicles need to solve unique computational puzzles generated by the neighboring RSUs in a limited time frame whenever they need to report their location information. Assuming a vehicle has a single Central Processing Unit (CPU) and parallel processing is not allowed, it can solve a single computational puzzle in a given time period. With this approach, the vehicles with multiple fake identities are prevented from solving multiple puzzles at a time. In this way, we can mitigate a Sybil attack and avoid the storage of fake location information in a smart contract table. Furthermore, the RSUs maintain a dedicated blockchain for storing the location information of neighboring vehicles. They take part in mining for the purpose of storing the smart contract table in the blockchain. This scheme guarantees the privacy of the vehicles, which is achieved with the help of a PoL privacy preservation mechanism. The verifier can verify the locations of the vehicles without revealing their privacy. Experimental results show that the proposed mechanism is effective in mitigating Sybil attacks in VANET. According to the experiment results, our proposed scheme provides a lower fake location registration probability, i.e., lower than 10%, compared to other existing approaches.
在本文中，我们提出了一种基于位置证明（PoL）的位置验证方案，用于减轻车载自组网（VANET）中的女巫攻击。为此，我们采用智能合约来存储车辆的位置信息。该智能合约由路边单元（RSU）维护，并作为验证相邻车辆位置信息的基本事实。为避免在智能合约中存储虚假位置信息，车辆在需要报告其位置信息时，需要在有限的时间内解决相邻RSU生成的独特计算难题。假设车辆只有一个中央处理器（CPU）且不允许并行处理，那么它在给定时间段内只能解决一个计算难题。通过这种方法，可防止具有多个虚假身份的车辆一次解决多个难题。这样，我们就能减轻女巫攻击，并避免在智能合约表中存储虚假位置信息。此外，RSU维护一个专用区块链来存储相邻车辆的位置信息。它们参与挖矿，以便将智能合约表存储在区块链中。该方案借助PoL隐私保护机制保证了车辆的隐私。验证者可以验证车辆的位置，而不会泄露其隐私。实验结果表明，所提出的机制在减轻VANET中的女巫攻击方面是有效的。根据实验结果，与其他现有方法相比，我们提出的方案提供了更低（低于10%）的虚假位置注册概率。
