Self-Bias and Self-Related Mentalizing are Unaltered in Adolescents with Autism.

PURPOSE

The self is a multidimensional concept that can be represented at a pre-reflective (first-order) level, at a deeper, reflective level (second-order), or even at a meta-level (representing one's own thoughts, i.e. self-related mentalizing). Since self-related processing and mentalizing are crucial for social cognition, both constructs have been researched in individuals with autism, who experience persistent socio-communicative difficulties. Some studies suggested autism-related reductions of the self-bias, i.e. tendency to preferentially process self-related content; while others observed a decreased ability to mentalize on one's own thoughts in autism. However, prior research examined distinct levels of self-related processing in isolation, in the context of separate studies.

METHODS

In this investigation, we directly compared self-bias, self- and other-related mentalizing within the same sample of adolescents with and without autism, to identify which of these are altered in this condition. Thirty adolescents with autism and 26 age- and IQ-matched controls performed a visual search task (first-order self-bias), a trait adjectives task (second-order self-bias), a feeling-of-knowing task (self-related mentalizing) and the Frith-Happé animations task (other-related mentalizing). Parents also completed two questionnaires (i.e. SRS, SCQ) assessing the adolescent's degree of autism traits.

RESULTS

Our findings replicated previous research showing reduced other-related mentalizing in autism. However, we did not find any difference between adolescents with and without autism in terms of first- or second-order self-bias, nor in the ability to mentalize on one's own thoughts.

CONCLUSION

In line with recent investigations, our results do not support earlier claims of altered self-related information processing in autism.