Gao Dandan, Guo Wei
Party School of Liaoning Provincial Party Committee, Shenyang, 110004, China.
Sci Rep. 2025 Jan 17;15(1):2314. doi: 10.1038/s41598-024-80733-3.
Public health emergencies are critical to people's lives and health, economic development and social stability. Understanding how to respond correctly to public health emergencies is the focus of societal attention. This paper focuses on the tripartite entities of public health emergencies: local governments, pharmaceutical enterprises and the public. On the basis of the assumption of finite rationality, it delves into the game-theoretic interaction among these groups during such crises. By constructing an evolutionary game model, this paper analyses the dynamic adjustment process of the decision-making behaviors of these three parties, leading to the identification of evolutionarily stable strategies for the local government, pharmaceutical enterprises, and the public under different conditions. Moreover, MATLAB is used to carry out simulation experiments to analyse the influence of the local government's reward and punishment mechanism on the strategic choices of the involved parties in the game. The research findings indicate that (1) For the tripartite entities of public health emergencies, the key for strategy choices is to reduce the gain obtained from illegal production and non-cooperation with prevention and control. (2) The strength of the initial willingness to participate has a significant effect on the evolution strategies of each subject. (3) For pharmaceutical companies and the public, the incentives and penalties of local governments can promote the former's compliance and the latter's cooperation in prevention and control. Based on these results, countermeasure suggestions to promote mutual collaboration among local governments, pharmaceutical enterprises, and the public to jointly respond to public health emergencies are proposed.
突发公共卫生事件关乎人民生命健康、经济发展和社会稳定。如何正确应对突发公共卫生事件是社会关注的焦点。本文聚焦于突发公共卫生事件中的三方主体：地方政府、制药企业和公众。在有限理性假设的基础上，深入探讨了这些群体在危机期间的博弈互动。通过构建演化博弈模型，分析了三方决策行为的动态调整过程，从而确定了不同条件下地方政府、制药企业和公众的演化稳定策略。此外，利用MATLAB进行仿真实验，分析地方政府奖惩机制对博弈中参与方战略选择的影响。研究结果表明：（1）对于突发公共卫生事件的三方主体而言，战略选择的关键在于降低非法生产以及不配合防控所获得的收益。（2）初始参与意愿的强度对各主体的演化策略有显著影响。（3）对于制药企业和公众来说，地方政府的激励和惩罚能够促使前者合规、后者配合防控。基于这些结果，提出了促进地方政府、制药企业和公众相互协作、共同应对突发公共卫生事件的对策建议。
