School of Public Finance and Taxation, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan, 430070, China.
School of Economics, Fudan University, Shanghai, 200082, China.
Sci Rep. 2022 Jan 10;12(1):474. doi: 10.1038/s41598-021-04458-3.
This paper studied a tripartite evolutionary game of stakeholders in environmental pollution control. Most previous studies on this issue are limited to a focus on system dynamics with two-party game problems and lack a spatial analysis of strategy evolution. The parameters adopted are too few, and the influencing factors considered are too simple. The purpose of the paper is to introduce more parameters to study, which will have an important impact on the strategy choices of participants and the evolution path of the strategy over time. We construct a tripartite evolutionary game model of sewage enterprises, governments and the public. We establish a payment matrix and replicator equations as our method, and we also implement parameter simulations in MATLAB. In summary, we found that the reward and punishment mechanism plays an important role in environmental pollution control. Specifically: intensifying rewards and penalties will help encourage sewage enterprises to meet the discharge standard and the public to participate in pollution control action. However, increased rewards will reduce government's willingness to adopt incentive strategies; Government's reward for public's participation in the action must be greater than the increased cost of participation; Reducing the cost of sewage enterprise can also encourage them to implement standard emissions. The research presented in this paper further improves standard emissions and designs reasonable reward and punishment mechanism.
本文研究了环境污染控制中利益相关者的三方演化博弈。以往关于这一问题的大多数研究都局限于关注具有两方博弈问题的系统动力学，缺乏对策略演化的空间分析。所采用的参数太少，考虑的影响因素也过于简单。本文的目的是引入更多的参数进行研究，这将对参与者的策略选择以及策略随时间的演化路径产生重要影响。我们构建了一个污水企业、政府和公众的三方演化博弈模型。我们建立了支付矩阵和复制者方程作为我们的方法，并在 MATLAB 中进行了参数模拟。总的来说，我们发现奖励和惩罚机制在环境污染控制中起着重要作用。具体来说：加强奖惩力度将有助于鼓励污水企业达到排放标准，鼓励公众参与污染控制行动。然而，增加奖励会降低政府采取激励策略的意愿；政府对公众参与行动的奖励必须大于参与成本的增加；降低污水企业的成本也可以鼓励它们实施标准排放。本文的研究进一步提高了排放标准，并设计了合理的奖惩机制。
