Garrido Carlos M, Santos Francisco C, Fernández Domingos Elias, Nunes Ana M, Pacheco Jorge M
BioSystems and Integrative Sciences Institute, Faculdade de Ciências da Universidade de Lisboa Campo Grande, 1749-016, Lisbon, Portugal.
ATP-group, 2744-016, Porto Salvo, Portugal.
Sci Rep. 2025 Jan 31;15(1):3865. doi: 10.1038/s41598-025-87322-y.
The sustainable governance of Global Risky Commons (GRC)-global commons in the presence of a sizable risk of overall failure-is ubiquitous and requires a global solution. A prominent example is the mitigation of the adverse effects of global warming. In this context, the Collective Risk Dilemma (CRD) provides a convenient baseline model which captures many important features associated with GRC type problems by formulating them as problems of cooperation. Here we make use of the CRD to develop, for the first time, a bottom-up institutional governance framework of GRC. We find that the endogenous creation of local institutions that require a minimum consensus amongst group members-who, in turn, decide the nature of the institution (reward/punishment) via an electoral process-leads to higher overall cooperation than previously proposed designs, especially at low risk, proving that carrots and sticks implemented through local voting processes are more powerful than other designs. The stochastic evolutionary game theoretical model framework developed here further allows us to directly compare our results with those stemming from previous models of institutional governance. The model and the methods employed here are relevant and general enough to be applied to a variety of contemporary interdisciplinary problems.
全球风险公地（GRC）——存在全面失败重大风险的全球公地——的可持续治理无处不在，需要全球解决方案。一个突出的例子是减轻全球变暖的不利影响。在此背景下，集体风险困境（CRD）提供了一个便利的基线模型，通过将与GRC类型问题相关的许多重要特征表述为合作问题来加以捕捉。在此，我们首次利用CRD来构建一个GRC的自下而上的制度治理框架。我们发现，内生性地创建需要小组成员达成最低共识的地方制度——小组成员进而通过选举过程决定制度的性质（奖励/惩罚）——会带来比此前提出的设计更高的总体合作，尤其是在低风险情况下，这证明通过地方投票过程实施的奖惩措施比其他设计更有效。这里开发的随机进化博弈理论模型框架，还使我们能够直接将我们的结果与先前制度治理模型的结果进行比较。这里采用的模型和方法具有足够的相关性和通用性，可应用于各种当代跨学科问题。
