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财富不平等下气候政策中风险与合作的共同演化

Co-evolution of risk and cooperation in climate policies under wealth inequality.

作者信息

Pacheco Jorge M, Santos Francisco C

机构信息

INESC-ID, IST-Taguspark, 2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal.

ATP-Group, P-2744-016 Porto Salvo, Portugal.

出版信息

PNAS Nexus. 2024 Dec 9;3(12):pgae550. doi: 10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae550. eCollection 2024 Dec.

DOI:10.1093/pnasnexus/pgae550
PMID:39677363
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC11646703/
Abstract

Worldwide cooperation is necessary to mitigate the effects of climate change. Many previous investigations employed the so-called collective risk dilemma, where the risk of losing everything whenever a target is not met was fixed from the outset, rendering predictions dependent on snapshot values assumed for this parameter, whose importance was found to be paramount. Here, we couple risk with the overall success of mitigation, investigating the co-evolution of risk and cooperation in a world where countries are partitioned in two different wealth classes, allowing us to further assess the impact of wealth inequality and homophily on the co-evolutionary dynamics. We show that the stochastic dynamics is dominated by a global attractor, typically located in a region of low risk, where most developed countries cooperate most of the time while developing countries cooperate to a lesser extent. This scenario assumes no homophily which, when moderate, can contribute to increase overall cooperation, more so when combined with the presence of a small fraction of developing countries that opt for an unconditional cooperative behavior.

摘要

全球合作对于减轻气候变化的影响至关重要。许多先前的研究采用了所谓的集体风险困境,即每当未达到目标时失去一切的风险从一开始就固定下来,这使得预测依赖于为该参数假设的快照值,而该参数的重要性被发现是至关重要的。在这里,我们将风险与缓解的总体成功联系起来,研究在一个国家被划分为两个不同财富类别的世界中风险与合作的共同演化,这使我们能够进一步评估财富不平等和同质性对共同演化动态的影响。我们表明,随机动态由一个全局吸引子主导,该吸引子通常位于低风险区域,在该区域大多数发达国家大部分时间都进行合作,而发展中国家的合作程度较低。这种情况假设不存在同质性,适度的同质性可以有助于增加总体合作,当与一小部分选择无条件合作行为的发展中国家同时存在时更是如此。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/cc55/11646703/c9f76b5d40b6/pgae550f4.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/cc55/11646703/5712a99f7af1/pgae550f1.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/cc55/11646703/2642a15c2227/pgae550f2.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/cc55/11646703/5ff6cb5d6597/pgae550f3.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/cc55/11646703/c9f76b5d40b6/pgae550f4.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/cc55/11646703/5712a99f7af1/pgae550f1.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/cc55/11646703/2642a15c2227/pgae550f2.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/cc55/11646703/5ff6cb5d6597/pgae550f3.jpg
https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/cc55/11646703/c9f76b5d40b6/pgae550f4.jpg

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