Ghasemi Omid, Handley Simon J, Stephens Rachel G
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW, 2052, Australia.
School of Psychological Sciences, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.
Mem Cognit. 2025 Apr 11. doi: 10.3758/s13421-025-01710-3.
When individuals are asked to evaluate the believability of the conclusions to valid or invalid arguments, they often endorse valid conclusions at higher rates than invalid ones. This effect of validity on belief judgments-the "logic-belief effect" -is considered evidence of intuitive logic. However, recent studies challenged this interpretation by demonstrating that "pseudo-logical" arguments interfere with belief judgments in the same way as valid logical structures do. This finding suggests that a simple heuristic that relies on the matching of constituent propositions, rather than sensitivity to logical validity per se, may lead to the logic-belief effect. To further test this matching heuristic account, across two experiments, we instructed participants to evaluate the conclusions of a series of logical and pseudo-logical arguments based on logic or belief, before and after a logic training block. The results showed that whilst both judgment types were impacted by both logical and pseudo-logical structures before training, after training the effect of the latter was indeed minimized in logic judgments but not belief judgments. The results largely support the matching heuristic account, which have important implications for contemporary dual-process theories of reasoning.
当要求个体评估有效或无效论证结论的可信度时，他们通常对有效结论的认可率高于无效结论。有效性对信念判断的这种影响——“逻辑-信念效应”——被视为直觉逻辑的证据。然而，最近的研究对这一解释提出了挑战，这些研究表明，“伪逻辑”论证与有效的逻辑结构一样，会干扰信念判断。这一发现表明，一种简单的启发式方法，即依赖于组成命题的匹配，而非对逻辑有效性本身的敏感性，可能会导致逻辑-信念效应。为了进一步检验这种匹配启发式解释，我们在两个实验中，让参与者在逻辑训练模块前后，根据逻辑或信念来评估一系列逻辑和伪逻辑论证的结论。结果表明，虽然在训练前，两种判断类型都受到逻辑和伪逻辑结构的影响，但在训练后，后者的影响在逻辑判断中确实最小化了，但在信念判断中却没有。这些结果在很大程度上支持了匹配启发式解释，这对当代推理的双过程理论具有重要意义。
