School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake Circus, Plymouth, Devon, United Kingdom.
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 2011 Jan;37(1):28-43. doi: 10.1037/a0021098.
According to dual-process accounts of thinking, belief-based responses on reasoning tasks are generated as default but can be intervened upon in favor of logical responding, given sufficient time, effort, or cognitive resource. In this article, we present the results of 5 experiments in which participants were instructed to evaluate the conclusions of logical arguments on the basis of either their logical validity or their believability. Contrary to the predictions arising from these accounts, the logical status of the presented conclusion had a greater impact on judgments concerning its believability than did the believability of the conclusion on judgments about whether it followed logically. This finding was observed when instructional set was presented as a between-participants factor (Experiment 1), when instruction was indicated prior to problem presentation by a cue (Experiment 2), and when the cue appeared simultaneously with conclusion presentation (Experiments 3 and 4). The finding also extended to a range of simple and more complex argument forms (Experiment 5). In these latter experiments, belief-based judgments took significantly longer than those made under logical instructions. We discuss the implications of these findings for default interventionist accounts of belief bias.
根据思维的双重加工理论，在推理任务中，基于信念的反应是默认产生的，但如果有足够的时间、精力或认知资源，就可以干预这种反应，转而支持逻辑反应。在本文中，我们呈现了 5 项实验的结果，这些实验要求参与者根据逻辑有效性或可置信度来评估逻辑论证的结论。与这些理论所预测的相反，呈现的结论的逻辑地位对判断其可置信度的影响大于结论的可置信度对判断其是否符合逻辑的影响。当指令作为被试间因素呈现时（实验 1），当通过线索在问题呈现前指示指令时（实验 2），以及当线索与结论同时呈现时（实验 3 和实验 4），都观察到了这一发现。这一发现还扩展到了一系列简单和更复杂的论证形式（实验 5）。在后一类实验中，基于信念的判断比基于逻辑指令的判断耗时更长。我们讨论了这些发现对信念偏差的默认干预主义理论的影响。
