Wang Yuan, Yan Huaicheng, Park Ju H, Hu Yunsong, Shen Hao
IEEE Trans Cybern. 2025 Jul;55(7):3390-3402. doi: 10.1109/TCYB.2025.3555396.
This article is concerned with the observer-dependent asynchronous control problem in cyber-physical systems (CPSs) vulnerable to multimode attacks, with a specific focus on addressing the significant challenge posed by the surreptitious nature of attack behaviors. First, in view of band-limited communication channels in CPSs, the quantizer is used to quantize the measured output. Second, owing to the open and shared network of CPSs, the data transmission process is more susceptible to attacks. A multichannel transmission framework is constructed under the assumption that each transmitted data element is susceptible to potential attacks. The switching dynamics among various attack forms launched by the adversary on the transmission channel are governed by a semi-Markov chain. The analysis of multimode attacks with stealth characteristics is conducted within the framework of a hidden semi-Markov jump mode, which is achieved by establishing a dual-layer stochastic process comprising a multimode sequence and an observed mode sequence. Leveraging emission probability, we design an observed-mode-dependent controller capable of stabilizing the system even in the absence of direct access to the actual attack patterns and in the presence of information loss. The simulations involving a single-channel unmanned ground vehicle system and a mass-spring-damper system with two channels are provided to validate the feasibility and efficacy of our proposed methodology.
本文关注易受多模式攻击的网络物理系统（CPS）中依赖观测器的异步控制问题，特别聚焦于应对攻击行为的隐秘性所带来的重大挑战。首先，鉴于CPS中的带宽受限通信信道，使用量化器对测量输出进行量化。其次，由于CPS的网络是开放且共享的，数据传输过程更容易受到攻击。在每个传输数据元素都易受潜在攻击的假设下，构建了一个多通道传输框架。对手在传输信道上发动的各种攻击形式之间的切换动态由一个半马尔可夫链控制。在隐藏半马尔可夫跳跃模式的框架内对具有隐身特性的多模式攻击进行分析，这通过建立一个由多模式序列和观测模式序列组成的双层随机过程来实现。利用发射概率，我们设计了一种依赖观测模式的控制器，即使在无法直接获取实际攻击模式且存在信息丢失的情况下，该控制器也能使系统稳定。提供了涉及单通道无人地面车辆系统和双通道质量 - 弹簧 - 阻尼系统的仿真，以验证我们所提出方法的可行性和有效性。
