Menges Leonhard, Weber-Guskar Eva
Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Social Sciences, Paris Lodron University Salzburg, Franziskanergasse 1, 5020 Salzburg, Austria.
Institute of Philosophy I, Faculty for Philosophy and Science of Education, Ruhr-University Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, 44801 Bochum, Germany.
Philos Technol. 2025;38(2):77. doi: 10.1007/s13347-025-00895-4. Epub 2025 May 27.
Intuitively, it seems reasonable to prefer that not everyone knows about all our emotions, for example, who we are in love with, who we are angry with, and what we are ashamed of. Moreover, prominent examples in the philosophical discussion of privacy include emotions. Finally, empirical studies show that a significant number of people in the UK and US are uncomfortable with digital emotion detection. In light of this, it may be surprising to learn that current data protection laws in Europe, which are designed to protect privacy, do not specifically address data about emotions. Understanding and discussing this incongruity is the subject of this paper. We will argue for two main claims: first, that anonymous emotion data does not need special legal protection, and second, that there are very good moral reasons to provide non-anonymous emotion data with special legal protection.
直观地说，似乎有理由希望并非每个人都知晓我们所有的情绪，比如我们爱上了谁、我们对谁生气以及我们感到羞耻的事情。此外，在隐私哲学讨论中的突出例子包括情绪。最后，实证研究表明，英国和美国相当多的人对数字情绪检测感到不安。有鉴于此，得知欧洲现行旨在保护隐私的数据保护法并未专门涉及情绪数据，可能会令人惊讶。理解并讨论这种不一致性是本文的主题。我们将论证两个主要观点：其一，匿名情绪数据无需特别的法律保护；其二，有非常充分的道德理由为非匿名情绪数据提供特别的法律保护。
