Duncan Elizabeth, Horvath Akos, Iercosan Diana, Loudis Bert, Maddrey Alice, Martinez Francis, Mooney Timothy, Ranish Ben, Wang Ke, Warusawitharana Missaka, Wix Carlo
Johns Hopkins University, 3400 N. Charles Street, Baltimore, MD 21218, United States of America.
Federal Reserve Board, 20th Street and Constitution Avenue N.W., Washington, DC 20551, United States of America.
J Financ Stab. 2022 Aug;61:101016. doi: 10.1016/j.jfs.2022.101016. Epub 2022 May 26.
The broad economic damage of the COVID-19 pandemic poses the first major test of the bank regulatory reforms put in place after the Global Financial Crisis. Our study assesses the U.S. regulatory framework, with an emphasis on capital and liquidity requirements. Prior to the COVID-19 crisis, banks were well capitalized and held ample liquid assets, which partly reflects enhanced requirements. The overall robust capital and liquidity levels resulted in a resilient banking system, which maintained lending and market making through the early stages of the pandemic. Trading activity was a source of strength for banks, reflecting in part a prudent regulatory approach. That said, leverage requirements are associated with more repo position netting by banks, with potential implications for market making.
新冠疫情造成的广泛经济破坏对全球金融危机后实施的银行监管改革构成了首次重大考验。我们的研究评估了美国的监管框架，重点关注资本和流动性要求。在新冠危机之前，银行资本充足且持有大量流动资产，这部分反映了监管要求的提高。整体稳健的资本和流动性水平造就了一个有韧性的银行体系，该体系在疫情初期维持了放贷和做市业务。交易活动是银行的一个优势来源，部分反映了审慎的监管方法。话虽如此，杠杆率要求与银行更多的回购头寸净额结算有关，这可能会对做市业务产生影响。
