Liu Yunhan, Gao Changchun, Liu Jusheng
Glorious Sun School of Business and Management, Donghua University, Shanghai, 200051, China.
School of Economics and Management, Shanghai University of Political Science and Law, Shanghai, 201701, China.
Sci Rep. 2025 Jul 2;15(1):23137. doi: 10.1038/s41598-025-08645-4.
Carbon verification agencies and power enterprises play a crucial role in the process of reducing carbon emissions. Under government regulation, this paper explores the low-carbon behavior of carbon verification agencies and power enterprises, considering factors such as rewards and penalties, reputation, collusion, and costs. We first constructed a carbon emission reduction game model using evolutionary game theory and replicated dynamic equations to analyze the interactions between carbon verification agencies and power enterprises under government oversight. Subsequently, this study used theoretical derivation and numerical simulation to investigate the model's evolution and the influence of various factors on the system's evolution results. It is found that, firstly, the carbon emission reduction game between the carbon verification agency and the power enterprises will eventually be stabilized in two states (authentic verification and carbon emission reduction) and (fraudulent verification and no carbon emission reduction), and the specific stabilization of which state is closely related to the selection of the initial values of the parameters. Secondly, within a certain range, increasing the government's rewards and penalties, increasing the reputation loss of carbon verification agencies and power enterprises, reducing the benefits of collusion between two parties, reducing the cost of low carbon disclosure and emission reduction of power enterprises will help the construction of a cooperative pattern of low carbon emission reduction and authentic supervision of carbon verification agencies.
碳核查机构和电力企业在碳排放减排过程中发挥着关键作用。在政府监管下，本文探讨了碳核查机构和电力企业的低碳行为，考虑了奖惩、声誉、合谋和成本等因素。我们首先运用演化博弈理论构建了碳排放减排博弈模型，并利用复制动态方程分析了政府监管下碳核查机构与电力企业之间的相互作用。随后，本研究运用理论推导和数值模拟来研究模型的演化以及各种因素对系统演化结果的影响。研究发现，其一，碳核查机构与电力企业之间的碳排放减排博弈最终将稳定在两种状态（真实核查与碳排放减排）和（虚假核查与无碳排放减排），而具体稳定在哪种状态与参数初始值的选择密切相关。其二，在一定范围内，提高政府的奖惩力度、增加碳核查机构和电力企业的声誉损失、降低双方合谋的收益、降低电力企业低碳披露和减排成本，将有助于构建低碳减排合作格局以及碳核查机构的真实监管。
