Landers Renata S M, Hodgson Paul D, Puckette Michael, Chaki Sankar P, Wilson William, Higgs Stephen, Zuelke Kurt A
Global Health Research Complex (GHRC), Division of Research, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, United States of America.
Vaccine and Infectious Disease Organization (VIDO), University of Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, Canada.
One Health. 2025 May 2;20:101061. doi: 10.1016/j.onehlt.2025.101061. eCollection 2025 Jun.
The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic revealed the importance of rapidly identifying and controlling zoonotic diseases and underscored the necessity of coordinating and planning pandemic preparedness with comprehensive one health strategies to prevent and control the emergence and transmission of zoonotic pathogens. The present case study catalogued the scope and range of activities performed by the biocontainment research facilities that ultimately comprised the Research Alliance for Veterinary Science and BSL-3 Biodefense Network (RAV3N) created during SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. Results revealed that nearly all RAV3N members directly contributed to all aspects of the response against the pandemic, from human diagnostic testing to specialized animal disease models for developing medical countermeasures to investigating the potential for pets and wildlife to serve as potential reservoirs for the SARS-CoV-2. Reflecting their expertise, approximately 80 % of members developed multiple animal models as part of their SARS-CoV-2 research. RAV3N members investigated basic virology, transmission, and host susceptibility in animal models ranging from non-human primates and livestock, to wildlife, arthropods, and mice. Approximately half of member institutions provided SARS-CoV-2 diagnostic testing services and/or environmental wastewater testing and surveillance to augment limited public health laboratory capacity during the pandemic. State and Federal sources funded and authorized all the reported response activities, however only 40 % of these response activities were coordinated with local public health officials. A major recommendation is to improve direct communication and pandemic response planning between the veterinary science and zoonotic disease and human public health communities. RAV3N provides a model for sharing information and coordinating response activities between veterinary science and public health officials in future disease outbreaks.
2019冠状病毒病(SARS-CoV-2)大流行揭示了快速识别和控制人畜共患病的重要性,并强调了通过全面的一体化健康战略协调和规划大流行防范措施的必要性,以预防和控制人畜共患病原体的出现和传播。本案例研究记录了生物安全研究设施开展的活动范围,这些设施最终构成了在SARS-CoV-2大流行期间创建的兽医科学与生物安全三级生物防御网络研究联盟(RAV3N)。结果显示,几乎所有RAV3N成员都直接参与了应对大流行的各个方面,从人类诊断检测到用于开发医学应对措施的专门动物疾病模型,再到调查宠物和野生动物作为SARS-CoV-2潜在宿主的可能性。鉴于其专业知识,约80%的成员开发了多种动物模型作为其SARS-CoV-2研究的一部分。RAV3N成员在从非人类灵长类动物、家畜到野生动物、节肢动物和小鼠等各种动物模型中研究了基本病毒学、传播和宿主易感性。约一半的成员机构提供了SARS-CoV-2诊断检测服务和/或环境废水检测与监测,以在大流行期间增强有限的公共卫生实验室能力。州和联邦来源为所有报告的应对活动提供了资金并予以授权,然而这些应对活动中只有40%与当地公共卫生官员进行了协调。一项主要建议是改善兽医科学与人畜共患病以及人类公共卫生社区之间的直接沟通和大流行应对规划。RAV3N为未来疾病爆发时兽医科学与公共卫生官员之间共享信息和协调应对活动提供了一个模式。