Kim Woojin
National Bureau of Economic Research.
Quart J Polit Sci. 2025;20(2):231-268. doi: 10.1561/100.00024022. Epub 2025 Apr 14.
This paper studies the motives behind socially pressuring others in the context of voter mobilization. In this online experiment, college students choose whether to send an email that pressures their campus peers to register to vote for the 2020 U.S. Elections. The senders have a negative average willingness-to-pay (WTP) to send the email, meaning they would rather pay than pressure their peers. The experiment reveals two counteracting motives at play. On the positive side, senders believe that pressuring their peers will persuade them to register. On the negative side, they believe that their peers will dislike being pressured, which outweighs the positive motives. However, under anonymous messaging, they become much less sensitive to whether the recipient dislikes being pressured, and their average WTP turns positive. This pattern of behavior reflects voters who are motivated by the prospect of mobilizing their peers, but are restrained by self-interested concerns from social costs or retaliation.
本文研究了在选民动员背景下向他人施加社会压力背后的动机。在这个在线实验中，大学生们选择是否发送一封电子邮件，向校园同龄人施压，促使他们登记参加2020年美国选举投票。发送者发送电子邮件的平均支付意愿（WTP）为负，这意味着他们宁愿付费也不愿向同龄人施压。该实验揭示了两种相互抵消的动机在起作用。从积极的方面来看，发送者认为向同龄人施压会说服他们登记。从消极的方面来看，他们认为同龄人会不喜欢被施压，而这种消极因素超过了积极动机。然而，在匿名信息传递的情况下，他们对接收者是否不喜欢被施压变得不那么敏感，并且他们的平均支付意愿变为正值。这种行为模式反映出选民们受到动员同龄人的前景激励，但又因对社会成本或报复的自身利益担忧而受到抑制。
