Dong Li-Na, Zhang Mu
School of Applied Economics, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang, China.
Guizhou Institution for Technology Innovation & Entrepreneurship Investment, Guizhou University of Finance and Economics, Guiyang, China.
PLoS One. 2025 Sep 5;20(9):e0331421. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0331421. eCollection 2025.
This study aims to improve the market efficiency of intellectual property pledge financing, based on the perspective of willingness to perform of technology-based SMEs, this paper defined the end-of-period value conversion coefficient of pledged property (EVCC) to measure the comparative relationship between the end-of-period value of the pledged intellectual property and the sum of principal and interest of the loan and introduced it into the game payment matrix; using evolutionary game theory, based on the assumption of bounded rationality, an evolutionary game model of intellectual property pledge financing between technology-based SMEs and banks based on the EVCC was constructed, and a numerical simulation was then conducted. The results of asymptotic stability analysis showed that when a certain condition is met, the strategy combination (performance, loan) is the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS). The numerical simulation showed that the EVCC has a positive impact on the speed of technology-based SMEs choosing the performance strategy, and there is a positive threshold effect (The threshold is 0.90). The initial value of pledged intellectual property has a negative impact on the speed of technology-based SMEs choosing the performance strategy, and there is a reverse threshold effect (The threshold is 1250), as well as the pledge rate of intellectual property (The threshold is 0.375). However, the loan interest rate has no significant impact on the strategic choice of technology-based SMEs. In addition, the EVCC has no significant impact on the banks' strategy choice. The initial value of pledged intellectual property has a negative impact on the speed of banks choosing loan strategies, and there is a reverse threshold effect (The threshold is 1250). The pledge rate of intellectual property has an inverted U-shaped impact on the speed of banks choosing loan strategies ([Formula: see text] may be close to 0.30), and there is a reverse threshold effect (The threshold is 0.375). The loan interest rate has a positive impact on the speed of banks choosing loan strategies, and there is a positive threshold effect (The threshold is 0.03). In addition, the trustworthy joint incentive not only has a positive impact on the speed of technology-based SMEs choosing the performance strategy, but also has a positive impact on the speed of banks choosing the loan strategy, and both have a positive threshold effect (The threshold for both is 15), as well as the dishonesty joint punishment (The threshold for both is 85). This model enriches the multi-agent game theory framework of intellectual property pledge financing. The numerical simulation results can provide a decision-making reference for technology-based SMEs and banks to formulate intellectual property pledge financing strategies.
本研究旨在提高知识产权质押融资的市场效率，基于科技型中小企业履约意愿的视角，界定质押财产期末价值转换系数（EVCC）以衡量质押知识产权期末价值与贷款本息之和的比较关系，并将其引入博弈支付矩阵；运用演化博弈理论，在有限理性假设的基础上，构建基于EVCC的科技型中小企业与银行间知识产权质押融资演化博弈模型，并进行数值模拟。渐近稳定性分析结果表明，在满足一定条件时，策略组合（履约，贷款）是演化稳定策略（ESS）。数值模拟表明，EVCC对科技型中小企业选择履约策略的速度有正向影响，且存在正阈值效应（阈值为0.90）。质押知识产权初始价值对科技型中小企业选择履约策略的速度有负向影响，且存在反向阈值效应（阈值为1250），知识产权质押率也有此效应（阈值为0.375）。然而，贷款利率对科技型中小企业的战略选择无显著影响。此外，EVCC对银行的策略选择无显著影响。质押知识产权初始价值对银行选择贷款策略的速度有负向影响，且存在反向阈值效应（阈值为1250）。知识产权质押率对银行选择贷款策略的速度有倒U形影响（[公式：见原文]可能接近0.30），且存在反向阈值效应（阈值为0.375）。贷款利率对银行选择贷款策略的速度有正向影响，且存在正阈值效应（阈值为0.03）。此外，守信联合激励不仅对科技型中小企业选择履约策略的速度有正向影响，对银行选择贷款策略的速度也有正向影响，且二者均存在正阈值效应（二者阈值均为15），失信联合惩罚也是如此（二者阈值均为85）。该模型丰富了知识产权质押融资的多主体博弈理论框架。数值模拟结果可为科技型中小企业和银行制定知识产权质押融资策略提供决策参考。
