Johnson M K, Kahan T L, Raye C L
J Exp Psychol Gen. 1984 Sep;113(3):329-44. doi: 10.1037//0096-3445.113.3.329.
Experiment 1 tested the counterintuitive prediction that memories for one's own dreams should not be particularly easy to discriminate from memories for someone else's dreams. Pairs of people reported dreams to each other that they had either dreamed, read, or made up the night before. On a test requiring subjects to discriminate events they had reported from those reported by their partner, subjects had more difficulty with real dreams than with dreams they read or made up. Experiment 2 provided evidence that real dreams do not simply produce overall weaker memories; the deficit for dreams was eliminated with more time to respond and with more detailed cues. In addition, subjects' ratings of various characteristics of their memories (e.g., vividness, personal relevance) indicated that dreams were not generally weaker or impoverished. The results are interpreted within the framework for reality monitoring described by Johnson and Raye (1981): Memories for real dreams are proposed to be deficient in conscious cognitive operations that help identify the origin of information generated in a waking state. At the same time, real dreams are embedded in a network of supporting memories that can be drawn on for reality monitoring decisions under appropriate circumstances. Finally, a comparison of recognition and recall indicated that dreams may leave persisting memories that are difficult to access via free recall.
实验1检验了一个违反直觉的预测,即关于自己梦境的记忆并不特别容易与关于他人梦境的记忆区分开来。两人一组互相汇报前一晚做的梦,这些梦有的是他们真正做过的,有的是读过的,还有的是编造的。在一项要求受试者区分自己汇报的事件和对方汇报的事件的测试中,与阅读或编造的梦境相比,受试者对真实梦境的区分更困难。实验2提供了证据表明,真实梦境并非简单地产生总体上更弱的记忆;给予更多的反应时间和更详细的线索,对梦境的记忆缺陷就会消除。此外,受试者对其记忆的各种特征(如生动性、个人相关性)的评分表明,梦境通常并不更弱或更匮乏。研究结果是在约翰逊和雷伊(1981年)所描述的现实监控框架内进行解释的:真实梦境的记忆被认为在帮助识别清醒状态下产生的信息来源的有意识认知操作方面存在缺陷。与此同时,真实梦境被嵌入到一个支持性记忆网络中,在适当的情况下,可以利用这个网络来进行现实监控决策。最后,识别和回忆的比较表明,梦境可能会留下难以通过自由回忆获取的持久记忆。