Mancia M
Univrsità degli Studi di Milano, Istituto di Fisiologia Umana II, Italy.
Behav Brain Res. 1995 Jul-Aug;69(1-2):203-6. doi: 10.1016/0166-4328(95)00016-m.
Among the various functions of sleep, one is particularly significant for our mental life: that of producing dreams. This specifically human experience, which takes place only during sleep, is closely related with neurophysiological events. The coincidence between mental and biological events raises a complex epistemological question concerning the close relationship between dreams, viewed as a subjective experience and sleep, viewed as a vegetative experience which is possible to define from a behavioural, electrical, neurochemical and neurobiological viewpoint. In this presentation, the author criticizes Hobson and McCarley's internal generator theory, according to which the pons activates the limbic structures responsible for the recovery of memory in dreams, on account of physiological and psychological reasons. The author puts forward a cognitive hypothesis, which considers dreams as a symbolic process of elaborating, interpreting and reorganizing in narrative sequences all the material accumulated in the memory during waking hours. The author proposes, therefore, a psychoanalytical model of dreaming, in which dreams constitute a way of representing the individual's inner world with internal objects related with one another and with the Self.
在睡眠的各种功能中，有一种对我们的精神生活尤为重要：即产生梦境。这种仅在睡眠期间发生的特定人类体验与神经生理事件密切相关。精神与生物事件之间的巧合引发了一个复杂的认识论问题，即关于被视为一种主观体验的梦境与被视为一种从行为、电、神经化学和神经生物学角度可以定义的植物性体验的睡眠之间的紧密关系。在本报告中，作者批评了霍布森和麦卡利的内在发生器理论，基于生理和心理原因，该理论认为脑桥激活负责在梦中恢复记忆的边缘结构。作者提出了一种认知假设，该假设将梦境视为一种以叙事序列对清醒时记忆中积累的所有材料进行阐述、解释和重组的象征过程。因此，作者提出了一种梦境的精神分析模型，其中梦境构成了一种用相互关联且与自我相关的内在客体来呈现个体内心世界的方式。
