Brook A
Int J Psychoanal. 1995 Jun;76 ( Pt 3):519-32.
Using clinical vignettes, we first examine the idea that psychoanalysis is, in Gill's (1991) phrase, a hermeneutic science--hermeneutic because it interprets meanings, scientific because the meaning connections it deals with are also usually causal connections. Next we explore some aspects of the structure of the kinds of explanation distinctive to psychoanalysis. Three kinds are distinguished: conveyance of content explanations, which have been central in the accounts of some recent philosophers of psychoanalysis, and two kinds of explanation in terms of intentionality, in terms, that is to say, of what the psychic states in question are about. One deals with forward-looking states such as wishes, in which the state is about some future, sought-after state of affairs such as a wish-fulfilment; the other deals with backward-looking psychic states such as memories, in which the state to be explained is about some earlier experience, fantasy, or whatever, one often quite unknown to the analysand prior to analysis. The paper concludes by making a quick case for the idea that good explanations in terms of meaning or intentionality often also identify the cause of the psychic states being explained.
通过临床案例，我们首先考察这样一种观点，用吉尔（1991）的话说，精神分析是一门诠释学科学——之所以是诠释学的，是因为它解释意义；之所以是科学的，是因为它所处理的意义关联通常也是因果关联。接下来，我们探讨精神分析特有的解释结构的一些方面。区分出三种：内容传达解释，这在一些当代精神分析哲学家的论述中占据核心地位；以及两种意向性解释，也就是说，依据所讨论的心理状态所指向的内容进行的解释。一种涉及前瞻性状态，如愿望，在这种状态中，该状态指向某种未来的、追求的事态，如愿望的实现；另一种涉及回顾性心理状态，如记忆，在这种状态中，有待解释的状态指向某种早期经历、幻想或其他诸如此类的东西，而在分析之前，分析对象往往对此一无所知。本文最后简要论证了这样一个观点，即基于意义或意向性的良好解释往往也能确定被解释心理状态的原因。
