Parkin C
Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand.
J Med Ethics. 1995 Apr;21(2):106-11. doi: 10.1136/jme.21.2.106.
I take issue with Frank Leavitt's sketch of a pragmatic criterion for the relevance of metaphysics to medical ethics. I argue that appeal to the potential for confusion generated by metaphysical subtlety establishes a need for better communication rather than shows philosophical insight beside the point. I demonstrate that the proposed Criterion of Relevance has absurd consequences, and I claim that the relevance of philosophical doctrines, whether ethical or metaphysical, is best accounted for in terms of improved understanding.
我对弗兰克·莱维特勾勒的形而上学与医学伦理学相关性的实用标准提出异议。我认为，诉诸形而上学的微妙之处所产生的潜在混淆表明需要更好的沟通，而非表明哲学洞察力无关紧要。我证明了所提出的相关性标准会产生荒谬的后果，并且我主张，哲学学说（无论是伦理学的还是形而上学的）的相关性最好从增进理解的角度来解释。
