Forsberg R P
Department of Philosophy, Delta College, University Center, MI 48710, USA.
J Med Philos. 1995 Feb;20(1):25-42. doi: 10.1093/jmp/20.1.25.
In an article titled, "Who Shall Live When Not All Can?", James Childress proposes a system for allocating scarce lifesaving medical resources based on random selection procedures. Childress writes of random selection procedures, [They] "cannot be dismissed as a 'non-rational' and 'non-human' ...without an inquiry into the reasons, including human values which might justify it." My thesis is that once we concentrate on determining the rationality of random selection procedures, we will see that Childress's claim that we cannot dismiss such procedures as 'non-rational' is open to question. My claim will be that while both random selection and social worth procedures are rationally defensible systems, random selection procedures easily lead to specific choices that are objectively irrational, apart from the limited perspective of the random selection process itself.
在一篇题为《并非所有人都能存活时谁该活下去？》的文章中，詹姆斯·蔡尔德雷斯提出了一种基于随机选择程序来分配稀缺救生医疗资源的系统。蔡尔德雷斯在谈到随机选择程序时写道：“在没有探究其理由，包括那些可能为之辩护的人类价值观的情况下，不能将其斥为‘非理性’和‘非人道’……”我的论点是，一旦我们专注于确定随机选择程序的合理性，就会发现蔡尔德雷斯关于我们不能将此类程序斥为‘非理性’的说法是值得怀疑的。我的观点是，虽然随机选择和社会价值程序都是有合理依据的系统，但除了随机选择过程本身的有限视角外，随机选择程序很容易导致在客观上是非理性的具体选择。
