Eisenstadt D, Leippe M R
Derner Institute of Advanced Psychological Studies, Adelphi University, Garden City, New York 11530.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 1994 Oct;67(4):611-26. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.67.4.611.
In 4 experiments, college students received bogus personality-test feedback that they possessed an actual-self, ideal-self (desired but unpossessed), or rejected-self (unwanted and unpossessed) trait. When the test had low credibility, rejected-self feedback produced positive mood (PM), whereas ideal-self feedback produced negative mood (NM). Self-comparison of the feedback with self-representations apparently revealed the falsity of the feedback, making salient Ss' virtues or shortcomings. The pattern reversed when test credibility was high: Rejected-self feedback led to NM and ideal-self feedback to PM. These effects were not evident, however, when the feedback trait had high personal importance or when Ss generated counterexamples before feedback about an unimportant trait. This suggests that reactions to self-discrepant feedback depend on whether convincing counterexamples are readily accessed during self-comparison.
在4项实验中，大学生收到了虚假的性格测试反馈，称他们拥有某种实际自我、理想自我（期望但未拥有）或被拒斥自我（不想要且未拥有）的特质。当测试可信度较低时，被拒斥自我反馈会产生积极情绪（PM），而理想自我反馈会产生消极情绪（NM）。将反馈与自我表征进行自我比较显然揭示了反馈的虚假性，凸显了被试的优点或缺点。当测试可信度较高时，这种模式则相反：被拒斥自我反馈导致消极情绪，而理想自我反馈导致积极情绪。然而，当反馈特质具有高度个人重要性时，或者当被试在收到关于不重要特质的反馈之前就生成了反例时，这些效应并不明显。这表明，对自我差异反馈的反应取决于在自我比较过程中是否容易获得有说服力的反例。
