Frisch D, Clemen R T
Department of Psychology, University of Oregon, Eugene 97403.
Psychol Bull. 1994 Jul;116(1):46-54. doi: 10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.46.
Much research in psychology has evaluated the quality of people's decisions by comparisons with subjective expected utility (SEU) theory. This article suggests that typical arguments made for the status of utility theory as normative do not justify its use by psychologists as a standard by which to evaluate decision quality. It is argued that to evaluate decision quality, researchers need to identify those decision processes that tend to lead to desirable outcomes. It is contended that a good decision-making process must be concerned with how (and whether) decision makers evaluate potential consequences of decisions, the extent to which they accurately identify all relevant consequences, and the way in which they make final choices. Research that bears on these issues is reviewed.
心理学领域的诸多研究通过与主观期望效用（SEU）理论进行比较，对人们决策的质量进行了评估。本文认为，关于效用理论作为规范性理论地位的典型论证，并不能成为心理学家将其用作评估决策质量标准的理由。有人认为，要评估决策质量，研究人员需要确定那些往往会带来理想结果的决策过程。有人主张，一个良好的决策过程必须关注决策者如何（以及是否）评估决策的潜在后果、他们在多大程度上准确识别所有相关后果，以及他们做出最终选择的方式。本文对涉及这些问题的研究进行了综述。
