Boaz R F
Milbank Mem Fund Q Health Soc. 1975 Summer;53(3):337-52.
The debate over the future of the health care delivery system evolves around the policy issue of what constitutes a fair distribution of the medical services which are considered essential to prolonging life, curing disease, and relieving pain. A case can be made that a socially equitable distribution implies that consumption of medical services is independent of the consumer's income and payment for them unrelated to utilization. The present paper examines to what extent the provisions for financing a national health insurance system are likely to advance or hinder the fair distribution of health care services. Almost all bills specify a mix of direct (cost-shared) and indirect (prepaid) financing. When cost-sharing is based on the quantity of services or on the level of medical expenditure, it helps divert medical care and health insurance benefits to high-income persons at the expense of their low-or moderate-income counterparts. When indirect payments or premium levels are determined by insurance risks rather than by income, they may be too high for persons with moderate means, and are likely to exclude such persons from the national insurance program. When health insurance is tied to salaried employment, it discriminates against the unemployed and the self-employed. To rectify such inequities, some NHI proposals specify separate insurance plans for the disadvantaged. Such programs, which require income-testing to determine eligibility, are likely to be plagued by administrative complications currently engulfing other means-tested social welfare programs. The present paper makes some recommendations for the purpose of avoiding these difficulties and fostering equity in health care.
关于医疗服务提供体系未来的争论,围绕着一个政策问题展开,即什么构成了对延长生命、治愈疾病和减轻痛苦至关重要的医疗服务的公平分配。可以说,社会公平分配意味着医疗服务的消费与消费者的收入无关,且支付费用与使用情况无关。本文探讨了为国家医疗保险体系融资的规定在多大程度上可能促进或阻碍医疗服务的公平分配。几乎所有法案都规定了直接(费用分担)和间接(预付)融资的组合。当费用分担基于服务数量或医疗支出水平时,它会将医疗服务和医疗保险福利转向高收入人群,而牺牲低收入或中等收入人群的利益。当间接支付或保费水平由保险风险而非收入决定时,对于中等收入者来说可能过高,并且可能会将这些人排除在国家保险计划之外。当医疗保险与有薪就业挂钩时,它会歧视失业者和自营职业者。为了纠正这种不公平现象,一些国家医疗保险提案为弱势群体指定了单独的保险计划。这类需要进行收入测试以确定资格的项目,可能会受到目前困扰其他经过经济状况调查的社会福利项目的行政复杂性问题的影响。本文提出了一些建议,以避免这些困难并促进医疗保健的公平性。