Sillince J A
Management School, Sheffield University, United Kingdom.
Genet Soc Gen Psychol Monogr. 1993 Nov;119(4):491-513.
The current conflict theory of emotion states that emotions arise at junctures of plans in which circumstances show the likely attainment or nonattainment of a goal and in which those circumstances include other plans and other goals. But emotions often arise from side goals rather than from the goal being aimed at. This article raises the question of what a goal is and suggests that any goal statement should include goals about a person's identity, self-definition, and cognitive development. This approach questions the sharp distinction usually drawn between goal and cognitive structure and puts forward a broader view of emotion as the awareness of important cognitive change that results from the validation or invalidation of one's cognitive system or a part of it. This view emphasizes the role of having a model of the self and shows how emotions can be defined as beliefs about changes in belief. This approach suggests that, just as pain monitors changes in physical states, so emotions monitor changes in mental states, providing high-level information for the management of cognitions. Another function of emotion is to identify the type and magnitude of inconsistencies between two mental states in a timely manner; such identification avoids the need for logical proof or numerical calculation.
当前的情绪冲突理论认为,情绪产生于计划的节点,在这些节点上,情况显示出目标可能实现或无法实现,并且这些情况包括其他计划和其他目标。但情绪往往源于次要目标,而非所追求的主要目标。本文提出了目标是什么的问题,并建议任何目标陈述都应包括关于一个人的身份、自我定义和认知发展的目标。这种方法质疑了通常在目标和认知结构之间所划定的鲜明界限,并提出了一种更宽泛的情绪观,即情绪是对重要认知变化的觉察,这种变化源于一个人的认知系统或其一部分得到验证或未得到验证。这种观点强调了拥有自我模型的作用,并展示了情绪如何可以被定义为关于信念变化的信念。这种方法表明,正如疼痛监测身体状态的变化一样,情绪监测心理状态的变化,为认知管理提供高级信息。情绪的另一个功能是及时识别两种心理状态之间不一致的类型和程度;这种识别避免了进行逻辑证明或数值计算的需要。