Jackson J
University of Leeds.
J Med Ethics. 1993 Sep;19(3):183-7. doi: 10.1136/jme.19.3.183.
Does it signify morally whether a deception is achieved by a lie or some other way? David Bakhurst has challenged my view that it can signify. Here I counter his criticisms--firstly, by clarifying the terminology: What counts as a lie? Secondly, by exploring further what makes lying wrong. Bakhurst maintains that lying is wrong in that it infringes autonomy--and other deceiving stratagems, he says, do so equally. I maintain that lying is wrong in that it endangers trust--and other types of deceiving stratagems do not do so equally. Lying to patients, I contend, is an abuse of their trust. Other forms of their intentional deception need not be so, although, in our autonomy-minded culture, they are likely to be so.
欺骗是通过说谎还是其他方式实现的，这在道德上有区别吗？大卫·巴赫斯特对我的观点提出了质疑，我的观点是这可能有区别。在此我回应他的批评——首先，通过澄清术语：什么算作谎言？其次，通过进一步探究说谎为何是错误的。巴赫斯特认为说谎是错误的，因为它侵犯了自主性——他说，其他欺骗策略同样如此。我认为说谎是错误的，因为它危及信任——而其他类型的欺骗策略并非同样如此。我认为，对患者说谎是对他们信任的滥用。他们的其他形式的故意欺骗不一定如此，尽管在我们这个重视自主性的文化中，它们可能是这样。
