Wiener S L
Department of Medicine, University of Illinois College of Medicine at Chicago 60612, USA.
Mil Med. 1996 May;161(5):251-6.
Biological warfare (BW) aerosol attacks are different from chemical attacks in that they may provide no warning/all clear signals that allow the soldier to put on or remove his M17/M40 protective mask. Methods are now being perfected to detect a BW aerosol cloud using an airborne (helicopter) pulsed laser system to scan the lower altitudes upwind from a troop concentration of corps size, and to sample and analyze the nature of the aerosol within a brief time interval. This system has certain limitations and vulnerabilities, since it is designed specifically to detect a line-type aerosol attack. Provision of, training with, and field use of a lightweight dust mist or HEPA filter respirator for each soldier is proposed for protection against undetected aerosol attacks. This particulate filter respirator would be issued in addition to the M17/M40 mask. Such a BW respirator will be able to purify the soldier's air by removing particles in the 0.3- to 15-micro m-diameter range with an efficiency of 98 to 100%. Particle size of BW aerosols is in the same range, with an optimum size for high-efficiency casualty production of 1 to 5 micro m mass median diameter. The proposed BW respirator will be lightweight; will require low inhalation pressures; will be comfortable to wear for prolonged periods; will not interfere with vision, hearing, and communication; and will not degrade overall effectiveness and performance to the degree observed with the M17/M40 masks. Such respirators would be worn as part of a contingency defense against an enemy likely to use BW agents. This respirator could be worn for prolonged periods when under threat of an undetectable BW attack during weather conditions favorable to the success of such an attack (i.e., low wind velocity and temperature inversion in the target area). In addition, tactically important assets such as command and control centers and missile batteries can also be protected continuously by air filtration systems powered by electricity (modular collective protection equipment). Vaccinations against anthrax, botulism, Q fever, plague, and tularemia are now available and immune protection against ricin and staphylococcal toxins appears feasible in the near future. Chemotherapy can also be provided for prophylaxis of infectious agents released on the battlefield. The vaccines and antibiotics can provide back-up protection against an unexpected BW attack during a period when the BW respirator is not in use or malfunctions due to a poor seal or filter leak. Enemy sites of biological weapon production, assembly, testing, and storage, and delivery vehicles can be targeted for destruction by bombs and/or missiles. An integrated, well-planned, BW defense with multiple components can decrease the likelihood of a successful enemy BW aerosol attack.
生物战(BW)气溶胶攻击与化学攻击不同,因为它们可能不会提供让士兵戴上或摘下其M17/M40防护面具的预警/解除警报信号。目前正在完善一些方法,利用机载(直升机)脉冲激光系统检测生物战气溶胶云,该系统用于扫描军团规模部队集结地上风向的低空区域,并在短时间间隔内对气溶胶的性质进行采样和分析。该系统有一定的局限性和弱点,因为它是专门设计用于检测线状气溶胶攻击的。建议为每名士兵配备、训练并在野外使用轻型尘雾或高效空气过滤器呼吸器,以防范未被察觉的气溶胶攻击。这种微粒过滤器呼吸器将在M17/M40面具之外另行发放。这种生物战呼吸器将能够通过去除直径在0.3至15微米范围内的颗粒来净化士兵的空气,效率为98%至100%。生物战气溶胶的粒径也在同一范围内,产生高效伤亡的最佳粒径为质量中值直径1至5微米。所提议的生物战呼吸器将重量轻;吸气压力低;长时间佩戴舒适;不会干扰视力、听力和通信;并且不会像M17/M40面具那样降低整体效能和性能。这种呼吸器将作为对可能使用生物战剂的敌人的应急防御的一部分佩戴。在有利于此类攻击成功的天气条件下(即目标区域风速低和出现逆温),当受到未被察觉的生物战攻击威胁时,这种呼吸器可以长时间佩戴。此外,诸如指挥控制中心和导弹电池等具有战术重要性的资产也可以通过电力驱动的空气过滤系统(模块化集体防护设备)持续得到保护。目前已有针对炭疽、肉毒中毒、Q热、鼠疫和兔热病的疫苗,并且在不久的将来对蓖麻毒素和葡萄球菌毒素产生免疫保护似乎是可行的。也可以提供化疗药物来预防战场上释放的传染源。在生物战呼吸器未使用或因密封不良或过滤器泄漏而出现故障的期间,疫苗和抗生素可为防范意外的生物战攻击提供后备保护。敌方生物武器生产、组装、测试和储存地点以及运载工具可以成为炸弹和/或导弹的打击目标。一个由多个部分组成的综合、精心规划的生物战防御体系可以降低敌人成功发动生物战气溶胶攻击的可能性。