Hubbard T L
Department of Psychology, Texas Christian University, Fort Worth 76129, USA.
Conscious Cogn. 1996 Sep;5(3):327-58. doi: 10.1006/ccog.1996.0021.
Experiences of qualia, subjective sensory-like aspects of stimuli, are central to imagistic representation. Following Raffman (1993), qualia are considered to reflect experiential knowledge distinct from descriptive, abstract, and propositional knowledge; following Jackendoff (1987), objective neural activity is distinguished from subjective experience. It is argued that descriptive physical knowledge does not provide an adequate accounting of qualia, and philosophical scenarios such as the Turing test and the Chinese Room are adapted to demonstrate inadequacies of accounts of cognition that ignore subjective experience. Arguments by Dennett and others that qualia do not exist or that qualia do not provide additional explanatory power are addressed, and it is suggested that consideration of qualia is necessary in order to explain (and not just predict) objective behavior. The hypotheses of functional equivalence, second-order isomorphism, and psychophysical complementarity between imagery and perception are discussed, and the ability of analog and schematic models of imagery to account for qualia is examined.
感受质，即刺激的主观感觉类方面的体验，对于意象表征至关重要。按照拉夫曼（1993年）的观点，感受质被认为反映了与描述性、抽象性和命题性知识不同的经验性知识；按照杰肯多夫（1987年）的观点，客观神经活动与主观体验是有区别的。有人认为，描述性物理知识不足以解释感受质，诸如图灵测试和中文屋等哲学场景被用来证明忽视主观体验的认知解释存在不足。丹尼特等人关于感受质不存在或感受质不具有额外解释力的论点也得到了讨论，并且有人提出，为了解释（而不仅仅是预测）客观行为，有必要考虑感受质。文中讨论了意象与感知之间功能等效、二阶同构和心理物理互补性的假设，并考察了意象的模拟模型和图式模型解释感受质的能力。
