Banks W P
Department of Psychology, Pomona College, Claremont, California 91711, USA.
Conscious Cogn. 1996 Sep;5(3):368-80. doi: 10.1006/ccog.1996.0023.
It is argued that theoretical models cannot use qualia as explanatory tools, and cannot explain them either; thus, there is no way to make qualia do any useful work at all, at least in a theory. However, qualia do occur in both imagery and perception, and this article presents some ways of thinking about qualia from a functional perspective. Imagery differs from perception in its function. It is not a faded copy of perception. It is less distinct than perception because it is only as distinct as it needs to be, not because it is inherently indistinct. Qualia represent functionally relevant encodings whether in perception or imagery. The present approach is functionalist and quite similar to Pam's (1996).
有人认为，理论模型既不能将感受质用作解释工具，也无法对其进行解释；因此，至少在理论层面，根本没有办法让感受质发挥任何有用的作用。然而，感受质确实出现在意象和感知中，本文从功能的角度提出了一些思考感受质的方式。意象在功能上与感知不同。它不是感知的模糊副本。它不如感知清晰，是因为它只需达到所需的清晰程度即可，而不是因为它本质上就不清晰。感受质在感知或意象中都代表着功能上相关的编码。当前的方法是功能主义的，与帕姆（1996年）的方法非常相似。
