Morally relevant differences between animals and human beings justifying the use of animals in biomedical research.

I have attempted to show that the differential qualities of animals and human beings indeed to have bearing on moral rules and the derivation of rights, including rights established on the basis of reason and utilitarianism. Special rights for members of our species are not simply a consequence of human domination and self-interest. I also have tried to show that rights arise from values and that the qualities we value most highly often are the ones that distinguish human beings from other species. I maintain that giving more value to human lives over animal lives achieves reflective balance with the commonsense notions that most of us have developed. Because utilitarianism, contractualism, and the classical philosophical methods of Kant and Aristotle all may allow favoring human interests over animal interests, it seems reasonable to suspect that animal rights activists embrace narrow, extremist views. There are many uniquely human experiences to which we ascribe high value-deep interpersonal relationships, achieving a life's goal, enjoying a complex cultural event such as a play or an opera, or authoring a manuscript. Therefore, it would seem improper that social and ethical considerations regarding animals be centered entirely on the notion of a biological continuum, because there are many kinds of human experience-moral, religious, aesthetic, and otherwise-that appear to be outside the realm of biology. Knowledge about the biology of animals is helpful for making moral decisions about our obligations to them. Why, then, is there a substantial population of animal rights activists in Europe, the United States, and throughout the world, who would not agree with my conclusions? Certain habitual ways of thinking may encourage anthropomorphism and equating animal interests with human interests. Certain metaphysical beliefs, such as a belief in reincarnation, also might favor animal rights. It also is possible that a number of people are being deceived and misled by a smaller, more radical minority. I believe that a commitment to animal rights principles also may arise from a world view of strict naturalism. If ethical inquiry is based strictly on naturalism without criteria for value and goodness, then perhaps extreme views granting animals the same rights as human beings are a logical consequence of those premises; however, it is not clear to me whether one could be internally consistent and still maintain those beliefs. Moral convictions do not arise directly from the ethical frameworks I have discussed. The study of ethics only casts light on our presumptions and suppositions and helps us analyze and appraise our beliefs about justice, rights, and morality. Those of us who work with animals know that animals, particularly companion animals, can be wonderful to relate with, that they possess unique beauty and value, and that they enrich our lives and the world in which we live. In the strict biological sense, human beings are animals too, but in the broader sense, human beings are much more than animals. The life of a man, woman, or child is worth far more than the life of a mouse, rat, dog, or monkey.