Khushf G
Department of Philosophy, University of South Carolina, Columbia 29208, USA.
Theor Med. 1997 Mar-Jun;18(1-2):145-63.
Germund Hesslow has argued that concepts of health and disease serve no important scientific, clinical, or ethical function. However, this conclusion depends upon the particular concept of disease he espouses; namely, on Boorse's functional notion. The fact/value split embodied in the functional notion of disease leads to a sharp split between the "science" of medicine and bioethics, making the philosophy of medicine irrelevant for both. By placing this disease concept in the broader context of medical history, I shall show that it does capture an essential part of modern medical ideology. However, it is also a self-contradictory notion. By making explicit the value desiderate of medical nosologies, a reconfiguration of the relation between medicine, bioethics, and the philosophy of medicine is initiated. This, in turn, will involve a recovery of the caring dimensions of medicine, and thus a more humane practice.
格蒙德·赫斯洛认为，健康与疾病的概念并无重要的科学、临床或伦理功能。然而，这一结论取决于他所支持的特定疾病概念，即博尔施的功能概念。疾病功能概念中体现的事实/价值二分法导致医学“科学”与生物伦理学之间出现明显分歧，使得医学哲学对两者都毫无关联。通过将这一疾病概念置于更广泛的医学史背景中，我将表明它确实抓住了现代医学意识形态的一个重要部分。然而，它也是一个自相矛盾的概念。通过明确医学分类学的价值诉求，开启了对医学、生物伦理学和医学哲学之间关系的重新配置。反过来，这将涉及恢复医学的关怀维度，从而实现更人道的实践。
