Reiss S
Nisonger Center, Ohio State University, Columbus 43210-1296, USA.
J Anxiety Disord. 1997 Mar-Apr;11(2):201-14. doi: 10.1016/s0887-6185(97)00006-6.
Trait anxiety began as a psychodynamic concept, poorly tied to observables, and requiring Freudian defense mechanisms to explain recurrent anxiety episodes. Spielberger's thoughtful efforts improved the concept, but some important limitations remained. Lilienfeld, Turner, and Jacob (1989, 1993, 1996) uncritically accepted Spielberger's work on trait anxiety and asserted that it is the standard against which the concept of anxiety sensitivity should be judged (see also Lilienfeld, 1996). Taylor (1996) and McNally (1989, 1996) distinguished anxiety sensitivity from trait anxiety by noting that, whereas trait anxiety predicts future anxiety generally, anxiety sensitivity predicts future fear to anxiety sensations specifically. An important additional difference is that the two constructs use different indicators (past anxiety experiences versus ASI beliefs) to predict future anxiety and fear. Furthermore, only anxiety sensitivity implies that some phobics perceive the feared object to be harmless; what they fear is an uncontrollable anxiety/panic reaction to the stimulus, not the dangerous nature of the stimulus itself.
特质焦虑最初是一个心理动力学概念,与可观察到的现象联系不紧密,需要用弗洛伊德的防御机制来解释反复出现的焦虑发作。斯皮尔伯格的深入研究改进了这一概念,但仍存在一些重要局限性。利林菲尔德、特纳和雅各布(1989年、1993年、1996年)不加批判地接受了斯皮尔伯格关于特质焦虑的研究,并断言特质焦虑是评判焦虑敏感性概念的标准(另见利林菲尔德,1996年)。泰勒(1996年)和麦克纳利(1989年、1996年)通过指出以下内容,将焦虑敏感性与特质焦虑区分开来:特质焦虑通常预测未来的焦虑,而焦虑敏感性则专门预测未来对焦虑感觉的恐惧。另一个重要的区别是,这两个概念使用不同的指标(过去的焦虑经历与焦虑敏感性指数信念)来预测未来的焦虑和恐惧。此外,只有焦虑敏感性意味着一些恐惧症患者认为恐惧对象是无害的;他们害怕的是对刺激产生无法控制的焦虑/惊恐反应,而不是刺激本身的危险性。