Perring C
Department of Philosophy, University of Kentucky, Lexington, USA.
J Med Philos. 1997 Apr;22(2):173-97. doi: 10.1093/jmp/22.2.173.
In this paper I argue that a Naturalist conception of personhood, such as the one defended by Derek Parfit, implies that there are degrees of personhood, i.e., that it makes sense to say one individual has a greater degree of personhood than another. I describe both criteria of general personhood, which distinguish between persons and non-persons, and criteria of particular personhood, which distinguish between one person and another. I examine some of the consequences for ethics, including the rights to life, self-determination, and treatment. There may be circumstances in medicine where we have to judge the value of a patient's life in order to decide what medical treatment, if any, to provide, and although it may be emotionally difficult and politically dangerous, one relevant factor is what degree of personhood that individual has.
在本文中，我认为一种关于人格的自然主义概念，比如德里克·帕菲特所捍卫的那种概念，意味着人格存在程度之分，也就是说，可以说一个个体比另一个个体具有更高程度的人格是有意义的。我描述了区分人与非人的一般人格标准，以及区分一个人与另一个人的特定人格标准。我探讨了这对伦理学的一些影响，包括生命权、自决权和治疗权。在医学中可能存在一些情况，我们必须判断患者生命的价值，以便决定提供何种医疗治疗（如果有的话），尽管这在情感上可能很困难且在政治上很危险，但一个相关因素是该个体具有何种程度的人格。
