Gregory R L
Department of Psychology, University of Bristol, UK.
Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 1997 Aug 29;352(1358):1121-7. doi: 10.1098/rstb.1997.0095.
Following Hermann von Helmholtz, who described visual perceptions as unconscious inferences from sensory data and knowledge derived from the past, perceptions are regarded as similar to predictive hypotheses of science, but are psychologically projected into external space and accepted as our most immediate reality. There are increasing discrepancies between perceptions and conceptions with science's advances, which makes it hard to define 'illusion'. Visual illusions can provide evidence of object knowledge and working rules for vision, but only when the phenomena are explained and classified. A tentative classification is presented, in terms of appearances and kinds of causes. The large contribution of knowledge from the past for vision raises the issue: how do we recognize the present, without confusion from the past. This danger is generally avoided as the present is signalled by real-time sensory inputs-perhaps flagged by qualia of consciousness.
继赫尔曼·冯·亥姆霍兹之后，他将视觉感知描述为基于感官数据和过去知识的无意识推断，感知被视为类似于科学的预测性假设，但在心理上被投射到外部空间并被接受为我们最直接的现实。随着科学的进步，感知与概念之间的差异越来越大，这使得很难定义“错觉”。视觉错觉可以为视觉的对象知识和工作规则提供证据，但前提是这些现象得到解释和分类。本文根据表象和原因种类提出了一种初步分类。过去知识对视觉的巨大贡献引发了一个问题：我们如何在不被过去混淆的情况下识别当下。由于当下由实时感官输入发出信号——也许由意识的质态标记，这种危险通常得以避免。
