Wreen M
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University, Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201-1881, USA.
Theor Med Bioeth. 1998 Jan;19(1):73-88. doi: 10.1023/a:1009970129297.
This paper is a critical analysis of Tristram Engelhardt's attempts to avoid unrestricted nihilism and relativism. The focus of attention is his recent book, The Foundations of Bioethics (Oxford University Press, 1996). No substantive or "content-full" bioethics (e.g., that of Roman Catholicism or the Samurai) has an intersubjectively verifiable and universally binding foundation, Engelhardt thinks, for unaided secular reason cannot show that any particular substantive morality (or moral code) is correct. He thus seems to be committed to either nihilism or relativism. The first is the view that there is not even one true or valid moral code, and the second is the view that there is a plurality of true or valid moral codes. However, Engelhardt rejects both nihilism and relativism, at least in unrestricted form. Strictly speaking, he himself is a universalist, someone who believes that there is a single true moral code. Two argumentative strategies are employed by him to fend off unconstrained nihilism and relativism. The first argues that although all attempts to establish a content-full morality on the basis of secular reason fail, secular reason can still establish a content-less, purely procedural morality. Although not content-full and incapable of providing positive direction in life, much less a meaning of life, such a morality does limit the range of relativism and nihilism. The second argues that there is a single true, content-full morality. Grace and revelation, however, are needed to make it available to us; secular reason alone is not up to the task. This second line of argument is not pursued in The Foundations at any length, but it does crop up at times, and if it is sound, nihilism and relativism can be much more thoroughly routed than the first line of argument has it. Engelhardt's position and argumentative strategies are exposed at length and accorded a detailed critical examination. In the end, it is concluded that neither strategy will do, and that Engelhardt is probably committed to some form of relativism.
本文是对特里斯特拉姆·恩格尔哈特避免无限制虚无主义和相对主义之尝试的批判性分析。关注的焦点是他近期的著作《生物伦理学基础》（牛津大学出版社，1996年）。恩格尔哈特认为，没有任何实质性的或“内容充实的”生物伦理学（例如罗马天主教或武士道的生物伦理学）具有主体间可验证且普遍具有约束力的基础，因为仅凭世俗理性无法表明任何特定的实质性道德（或道德准则）是正确的。因此，他似乎要么陷入虚无主义，要么陷入相对主义。前者认为甚至不存在一条真正或有效的道德准则，后者认为存在多条真正或有效的道德准则。然而，恩格尔哈特至少以无限制的形式拒绝了虚无主义和相对主义。严格来说，他本人是一名普遍主义者，即相信存在一条单一的真正道德准则。他采用了两种论证策略来抵御无限制的虚无主义和相对主义。第一种策略认为，尽管基于世俗理性建立内容充实的道德的所有尝试都失败了，但世俗理性仍能建立一种没有内容、纯粹程序性的道德。尽管这种道德没有内容充实，也无法在生活中提供积极的指引，更不用说生活的意义了，但它确实限制了相对主义和虚无主义的范围。第二种策略认为存在一条单一的真正、内容充实的道德准则。然而，需要神恩和启示才能让我们知晓它；仅凭世俗理性无法胜任这项任务。在《基础》一书中，第二条论证路线并未得到深入探讨，但它确实不时出现，如果这条路线合理，虚无主义和相对主义就可以比第一条论证路线更彻底地被击败。恩格尔哈特的立场和论证策略得到了详细阐述并受到了详细的批判性审视。最终得出的结论是，这两种策略都行不通，而且恩格尔哈特可能陷入了某种形式的相对主义。
