Zeki S, Bartels A
Wellcome Department of Cognitive Neurology, University College, London, UK.
Proc Biol Sci. 1998 Aug 22;265(1405):1583-5. doi: 10.1098/rspb.1998.0475.
We present below a simple hypothesis on what we believe is a characteristic of visual consciousness. It is derived from facts about the visual brain revealed in the past quarter of a century, but it relies most especially on psychophysical evidence which shows that different attributes of the visual scene are consciously perceived at different times. This temporal asynchrony in visual perception reveals, we believe, a plurality of visual consciousnesses that are asynchronous with respect to each other, reflecting the modular organization of the visual brain. We further hypothesize that when two attributes (e.g. colour and motion) are presented simultaneously, the activity of cells in a given processing system is sufficient to create a conscious experience of the corresponding attribute (e.g. colour), without the necessity for interaction with the activities of cells in other processing systems (e.g. motion). Thus, any binding of the activity of cells in different systems should be more properly thought of as a binding of the conscious experiences generated in each system.
我们在下面提出一个关于视觉意识特征的简单假设。它源于过去二十五年中所揭示的有关视觉脑的事实，但它尤其依赖于心理物理学证据，该证据表明视觉场景的不同属性在不同时间被有意识地感知。我们认为，这种视觉感知中的时间异步性揭示了多个相互异步的视觉意识，反映了视觉脑的模块化组织。我们进一步假设，当同时呈现两个属性（例如颜色和运动）时，给定处理系统中细胞的活动足以产生对相应属性（例如颜色）的有意识体验，而无需与其他处理系统（例如运动）中细胞的活动进行交互。因此，不同系统中细胞活动的任何绑定都应更恰当地被视为每个系统中产生的有意识体验的绑定。
