Dobbins I G, Kroll N E, Liu Q
Department of Psychology, University of California, Davis 95616-8686, USA.
J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn. 1998 Sep;24(5):1306-15. doi: 10.1037//0278-7393.24.5.1306.
S. E. Clark (1997) offered a modified signal-detection explanation of the confidence-accuracy inversions observed in E. Tulving's (1981) experiments. In addition to replicating E. Tulving (1981), we had participants make "remember-familiar" judgments. Confidence and accuracy dissociated across subjective reports. Response confidence differed only for judgments based on familiarity, whereas accuracy differed only for "remember" responses. S. E. Clark's model does not predict this, nor can it mimic "remember" performance across all conditions. We propose that although "knowing" can be accommodated within an equal variance signal-detection account, "remembering" is governed by contextual constraints that influence the distinctiveness of information upon which participants rely during reports. The current paradigm is a pictorial analogue to H. L. Roediger and K. B. McDermott's paradigm (1995) in that participants claim to explicitly remember thematically related items that were not actually seen during study.
S. E. 克拉克（1997年）对E. 图尔文（1981年）实验中观察到的信心-准确性倒置现象提出了一种修正的信号检测解释。除了重复E. 图尔文（1981年）的实验外，我们还让参与者做出“记得-熟悉”的判断。信心和准确性在主观报告中出现了分离。反应信心仅在基于熟悉度的判断中有所不同，而准确性仅在“记得”反应中有所不同。S. E. 克拉克的模型无法预测这一点，也无法在所有条件下模拟“记得”的表现。我们提出，虽然“知道”可以纳入等方差信号检测理论，但“记得”受情境约束的支配，这些约束会影响参与者在报告时所依赖信息的独特性。当前的范式是H. L. 罗迪格和K. B. 麦克德莫特范式（1995年）的图像模拟，即参与者声称能明确记得在学习过程中实际未见过的主题相关项目。
