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为儿童制定正确的激励措施。

Getting the incentives right for children.

作者信息

Glied S

机构信息

Division of Health Policy and Management, Columbia School of Public Health, New York, NY 10032, USA.

出版信息

Health Serv Res. 1998 Oct;33(4 Pt 2):1143-60.

PMID:9776952
原文链接:https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC1070307/
Abstract

OBJECTIVE

One way to improve the functioning of the American child healthcare system is through the design of incentives. Objective: to examine what we know and need to know about designing incentives to encourage the production of high-quality care both for healthy children and for children with serious illnesses.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

For healthy children, incentives should encourage the provision of preventive services, including services that encourage healthy behavior. For children with serious illnesses, incentives should reduce risk selection, promote collaborative systems of care, and ensure access to appropriate specialty services. Research findings needed for incentive design includes information on the actual working of existing incentive mechanisms as well as information about risk adjustment, mixed payment system, carve-outs, and other mechanisms to reduce risk selection; options for defining service scope that encourage collaboration; and information about the ways in which quality measurement interacts with payment incentives.

摘要

目标

改善美国儿童医疗保健系统运作的一种方法是通过激励措施的设计。目标:研究我们对于设计激励措施以鼓励为健康儿童和重症儿童提供高质量护理所了解及需要了解的内容。

总结与结论

对于健康儿童,激励措施应鼓励提供预防性服务,包括鼓励健康行为的服务。对于重症儿童,激励措施应减少风险选择,促进协作式护理系统,并确保获得适当的专科服务。激励措施设计所需的研究结果包括有关现有激励机制实际运作的信息,以及有关风险调整、混合支付系统、分割、以及其他减少风险选择机制的信息;定义鼓励协作的服务范围的选项;以及有关质量衡量与支付激励措施相互作用方式的信息。

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Health Serv Res. 1998 Oct;33(4 Pt 2):1143-60.
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本文引用的文献

1
Diagnostic risk adjustment for Medicaid: the disability payment system.医疗补助计划的诊断风险调整:残疾支付系统
Health Care Financ Rev. 1996 Spring;17(3):7-33.
2
Risk-adjusted Medicare capitation rates using ambulatory and inpatient diagnoses.使用门诊和住院诊断的风险调整后的医疗保险按人头付费率。
Health Care Financ Rev. 1996 Spring;17(3):77-99.
3
Costs and incentives in a behavioral health carve-out.行为健康独立核算中的成本与激励措施。
Health Aff (Millwood). 1998 Mar-Apr;17(2):53-69. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.17.2.53.
4
Risk adjustment and Medicare: taking a closer look.风险调整与医疗保险:深入探讨
Health Aff (Millwood). 1997 Sep-Oct;16(5):26-43. doi: 10.1377/hlthaff.16.5.26.
5
What have HMOs learned about clinical prevention services? An examination of the experience at Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound.健康维护组织对临床预防服务有哪些了解?对普吉特海湾地区集团健康合作社经验的考察。
Milbank Q. 1996;74(4):469-509.
6
Some economics of mental health 'carve-outs'.一些心理健康“专项保险”的经济学分析。
Arch Gen Psychiatry. 1996 Oct;53(10):933-7. doi: 10.1001/archpsyc.1996.01830100081010.
7
Assuring quality of care for children with special needs in managed care organizations: roles for pediatricians.确保管理式医疗组织中特殊需求儿童的医疗质量:儿科医生的角色。
Pediatrics. 1996 Aug;98(2 Pt 1):178-85.
8
Capitation adjustment for pediatric populations.针对儿科人群的人头费调整。
Pediatrics. 1996 Jul;98(1):10-7.
9
Barriers to the use of preventive health care services for children.儿童预防性医疗保健服务使用的障碍。
Public Health Rep. 1996 Jan-Feb;111(1):71-7.
10
Refinements to the Diagnostic Cost Group (DCG) model.诊断成本组(DCG)模型的改进
Inquiry. 1995;32(4):418-29.